
It is now crystal clear that the in the eyes of the security state  India, a potential world power, prickly relationship with its pygmy  neighbour Bangladesh is worth attention at all if India’s security  concerns warrant such attention. Otherwise India would habitually  continue to sit like the giant elephant it is over the unresolved issues  with its small, insignificant neighbour, the status quo being in its  favour. This was succinctly brought out in the Banyan column of The  Economist of London, Aug. 30th issue, under the title “Go east, old man”  ahead of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s official Dhaka visit  (the first such visit by an Indian Prime Minister belonging to the  Congress Party since Indira Gandhi’s visit for Indira-Mujib border  delineation agreement in 1974). The article observed:
“Ahead  of a visit to Bangladesh next week by India’s prime minister, Manmohan  Singh, officials from both sides have been acting as if economic  ties—stunted by decades of mistrust and neglect—will soon be soaring,  such as to match political ties of almost indecent buoyancy. 
  
 
“Despite the two countries’ shared history and geography, India is  not even among Bangladesh’s top-ten foreign investors. India may have  close political ties with its eastern neighbour. But China wins the  economic competition in Bangladesh hands down. China is Bangladesh’s  biggest trading partner, as well as its primary supplier of military  equipment. And it seems that not a month goes by without Chinese  companies winning contracts to build power stations, roads, telecoms and  other infrastructure in Bangladesh. Mr Singh is to visit next week, and  his Congress-party boss, Sonia Gandhi, visited last month, but China’s  leader in waiting, Xi Jinping, visited Bangladesh more than a year ago. 
  
“Billions of dollars worth of goods are smuggled across the 4,100km  Indo-Bangladesh border every year. Making that trade legal would make  the official figures look more respectable. This week India’s home  minister, P. Chidambaram, laid the foundation stone for one of seven  planned trading posts along the border. If this sudden burst of  enthusiasm for economic integration catches on, Bangladeshis may soon  have to come up with a new nickname for India’s Border Security Force.  These days the BSF is insulted as the Border Smuggling Force.
 
  
Iron fence
 
“Bangladesh’s prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, is not asking Mr Singh  to dismantle the iron fence that runs along the world’s fifth-longest  international border. It cost India billions of dollars to build and  enforce and still defines its wonky border (also one of the world’s  bloodiest). Instead Sheikh Hasina appears to be urging India not to let  unresolved problems stand in the way of things that can be done. 
  
“The enthusiasm generated by the flying 30-hour visit that Mr Singh  has scheduled for September 6th and 7th  is not entirely misplaced. He  is expected to sign a deal on sharing water from the Teesta river. 
 
 
“Is it the perceived threat of cross-border terrorism, security  concerns in India’s north-east or China’s increasing influence that is  renewing India’s interest in its neighbour to the east?
  
“India is likely to make concessions as long as its security  concerns are not compromised. One area where progress is likely to be  made is the planned swapping of parcels of territory.”
  
That prediction proved uncannily accurate one week later when the  much-trumpeted Dhaka summit between India and Bangladesh achieved little  beyond “planned swapping of parcels of territory.” Throughout the  expectant week, though, the government of Bangladesh and the  India-friendly section of the Bangladesh media continued to raise high  hopes about the final touches being put on a framework of “historic”  leap forward in Indo-Bangladesh relations. The priority of India’s  security concerns was evident at the same time as India’s National  Security Adviser took over the charge of final negotiations of the  package of accords to be penned at the summit. Indeed, India’s national  security adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, who had left Dhaka only five days  ago ending a two-day visit, flew back Saturday (Sept. 3) on a brief  four-hour visit and held a ‘comprehensive discussion’ with the  Bangladesh side.
  
He held talks with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s economic affairs  adviser Mashiur Rahman and international affairs adviser Gowher Rizvi on  the issues to be discussed between the two prime ministers and the  details of a draft transit agreement proposed by India. Menon also held a  meeting with water resources minister Ramesh Chandra Sen to fine-tune  the agreements on sharing of the waters of Teesta and Feni rivers.
  
There were wide differences between the two sides over the fees  payable by India for using Bangladesh territory for trade with third  countries as well as passage of goods between its two places. There were  also differences over when India would be allowed to use Bangladesh  territory for transit. The Bangladesh side wanted time for settling  modalities on providing transit. 
  
The two governments are yet to agree on the proportions of the  waters of Teesta the two countries would divide. Bangladesh wants 50 per  cent share while India is negotiating for 55 per cent of the flow for  itself. The ministerial-level meeting of the Bangladesh-India Joint  Rivers Commission, which is expected to give finishing touches to the  agreements for sharing the waters of Teesta and Feni rivers, was  deferred at the request of India.
 
  
Water and transit
 
A Bangladesh government official said that India had tagged  agreements on Teesta and Feni rivers to signing of an agreement on  transit. 
  
According to the Foreign Ministry, as of Sept. 3, three agreements,  five MoUs and two protocols have been finalised and will be signed on  Sept. 6, the day Manmohan will arrive and hold official talks with his  Bangladesh counterpart Sheikh Hasina. An MoU expresses a convergence of  will between the parties, indicating an intended common line of action,  while protocol is defined as an international agreement which  supplements or amends a treaty. The three agreements ready to be signed  were: 15-year interim water sharing agreements on water sharing of the  Teesta and Feni rivers and import of 250 megawatt of electricity from  India.
  
 
The MoUs planned to be signed were on protection of the Sunderbans,  cooperation in renewable energy sector, cooperation in fisheries and  between BTV and Doordarshan, and joint venture on a coal-fired  1320-megawatt power plant.
  
Among the protocols, one was to be signed on land boundary while the other was on protection of tigers in the Sunderbans.
  
Besides, the issue of allowing Bhutan to use Rohanpur-Singhabad  sector for transporting goods was to be added to an existing protocol.
  
The Foreign Ministry said that there might be further developments in the coming two days in terms of signing more deals. 
  
Even on the next day, Dr. Dipu Moni, the foreign minister of  Bangladesh assured the press in Dhaka that the two countries were set to  sign three agreements including the sharing of the waters of the Teesta  and Feni rivers, two protocols and six Memoranda of Understanding, in  addition to exchanging letters giving formal consent for providing  transit to India.
  
The signing of an agreement for purchasing power from India was  left out, as “several formalities, including approval of the Cabinet  committee, were yet to be completed.”
  
But it turned out that the Shiv Shankar Menon visit on September 3  was in fact a prelude to Indian back-tracking manoeuvre, as the Indian  security establishment was not ready to concede much if its primary  requirement of an immediate framework deal for possible transit (or  corridor for passage, to be precise) through Bangladesh and use of  sea-ports at Mangla and Chittagong for India-to-India trade and traffic  under cover of existing trade agreements were finalised. A letter of  intent at this stage, as offered by Bangladesh side, was not enough for  India’s satisfaction.
 
  
Conflicting reports 
A spin was therefore created about the water sharing of Teesta  water by conflicting reports from Pashchimbanga. According to a report  of Kolkata-based Anandabazar Patrika on Sept. 1, Bangladesh was to get  48 per cent of Teesta water while India would retain 52 per cent. It  also reported that Pashchimbanga Chief Minister had cleared the draft  agreement.
  
On the other hand, referring to a meeting with Indian Security  Adviser Menon, Loksabha member from West Bengal Abu Hasem Khan Chowdhury  told BBC Bangla the same day that India would get 75 per cent of the  Teesta water and Bangladesh would get the remainder. As some of our  experts have later pointed out, there was no contradiction between what  was reported in Anandabazar Patrika and what Abu Hasem Khan Chowdhury  was told by Shiv Shankar Menon. Available water in Teesta for sharing  was to be measured at Gazaldoba barrage, upstream of which India was  already withdrawing unilaterally in Sikkim and on Sikkim-Paschimbanga  border Teesta water from two dams amounting possibly 36% percent of the  river’s flows. So, keeping 10% from Paschimbanga side and 10% from  Bangladesh side for the river’s self-dredging capacity, even if  Paschimbanga withdrew 39% at Gazaldoba near Bangladesh border, India in  fact would be reaping the benefit 75% of Teesta waters. As a matter  fact, Bangladesh was being bluffed by the draft Teesta agreement. But  even that agreement India was not ready to sign without a binding  transit accord. Therefore India drew two steps back after moving one  step forward. 
  
Although India-friendly sections of the media, of the establishment  and of the civil society are voicing deep disappointment that the  Manmohan Singh visit has flopped and produced no real headway for Teesta  water sharing and other pending issues from which Bangladesh could  benefit (of the 480 items for which FBCCI requested duty-free access to  Indian market, only 46 have been allowed by India), overwhelming public  reaction in Bangladesh is one of relief. Most people consider the  transit demand of India both as a security risk for Bangladesh from  northeast Indian insurgency and an economic liability in terms of safety  and maintenance costs of proposed transit routes. Many people are also  happy that Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in the end did stand  up to Indian pressure and refused to concede transit without adequate  reciprocity from the Indian side. Effectively, the net progress from the  visit, other things being incidental, was what The Economist in the  same column noted in its Sept 7th issue as follows: 
  
“September 6th, 2011, marks a watershed in the annals of bizarre  geography. It saw the prime ministers of India and Bangladesh sign an  agreement (essentially a protocol elaborating the 1974 land border  accord) that will consign a whopping 201 enclaves to the history books,  leaving just 49 similar exterritorial patches, mostly in Western Europe  and on the fringes of the former Soviet Union. The two South Asian  neighbours will exchange plots, including a patch of Bangladeshi land  surrounded by Indian territory itself improbably ensconced within  Bangladesh, clustered on either side of the border between the  Bangladeshi district of Rangpur and the district of Cooch Behar, in the  Indian state of West Bengal.
  
“In effect disowned by both states, the enclaves are pockets of abject poverty. 
  
“The Indira-Mujib Land Boundary Agreement in 1974 was meant to  change all that. In it, the two countries resolved to exchange enclaves  ‘expeditiously’, and India agreed to forgo compensation for the  additional area going to Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s parliament ratified  the treaty; India’s never did. 
  
“The agreed transfer simplifies the messy boundary but means a  40-square-kilometre net loss for India. It might seem that this is a  small price to pay for India to fix its wonky border. Predictably,  though, India’s opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has tried to  present the enclaves as symbols of Indian territorial inviolability and  an opportunity to flaunt its Hindu-nationalist credentials.”
  
The implementation of the agreed swap of border enclaves may  therefore yet turn out to be problematic like the tin bigha corridor.
By :
 Sadeq Khan.