What Pakistan Think : Conspiracy Of The Masses

JUDGING what Pakistanis really think about current affairs can be tricky. Do you ask the English-speaking chattering classes in the cities for their views on the death of Osama bin Laden, or try to find some way to hear what less-educated, rural folk conclude? Aside from venturing to places like Abbottabad, or specially- planned trips to see flood victims or assess life nearer the border of Afghanistan, many journalists, especially foreigners, are likely to end up hearing more from the better-off, English-speaking Pakistanis who live not far from their hotels. So a new poll on the aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death, by Gallup in Pakistan, makes for interesting reading. Researched between May 7 th and 10 th, it was run in both towns and rural areas, among a decent-sized sample of 2 ,530 people of various linguistic, educational and class backgrounds. The interviews were done in person, not over the phone, which means it reaches a wide range of people. It turns out that Pakistanis, as ever, believe in conspiracies. Although two- thirds, roughly, reckon that America trampled on Pakistani sovereignty in the Navy Seals’ raid to kill bin Laden on May 2 nd (perhaps surprisingly, as many as 23 % concluded that sovereignty was not infringed), nearly half (49 %) thought that the whole incident was actually staged for some reason or other. Only 26 % thought the al-Qaeda chief was really killed on the night in question. As for how Pakistanis sum up bin Laden himself: 44 % concluded he was a “martyr”, while 26% preferred to call him a “criminal”. The Pakistani fondness for conspiracies seems to have two causes. First, the conspiracy theory often turns out to be right: those who have seen the army’s hand in politics, or who reckon that spies, spooks and terrorists are meddling across their country, trying to shape developments, are proven correct more often in Pakistan than almost anywhere else. Banyan said as much , in reference to the arrest of an American CIA contractor, Raymond Davis, in February. A second reason for the popularity of conspiracy theories, however, is that ordinary people feel powerless. They feel that the powerful make their decisions out of sight, with little public scrutiny. Public funds, whether raised by taxes or aid, are spent with little scrutiny. There’s a lively press, noisy television shows, great exchanges of opinion and rage among politicians, commentators, lawyers and activists. But getting people to agree on facts is difficult. One Pakistani former ambassador to America put it nicely over a cup of tea last week, suggesting that “we love conspiracies because wherever there is a lack of information then rumours thrive”. This chimes with other findings in the Gallup poll. The one institution that Pakistanis have generally reckoned is reliable, the army, has taken a battering over the bin Laden affair. Nearly half of those polled (48 %) think that the army “connived” in the American raid on Abbottabad at the start of the month, representing a widespread and unusual criticism of the institution (considering so many of the respondents disapproved of the attack). Still, there is a consolation for the men in uniform: the civilian leaders are even less well liked, as 57 % of respondents saw complicity by their elected leaders.

Even China's All - Weather Friendship With Pakistan Has It's Limits

PAKISTAN’S ambassador to Beijing, Masood Kahn, was this week fully armed with metaphors to describe the robust friendship between the two countries. “We say it is higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight, sweeter than honey, and so on.” The relationship is indeed a geopolitical keystone for both countries. Pakistan serves as China’s closest friend both in South Asia and among Islamic countries. So close, indeed, that many suspect China has asked Pakistan for the valuable remains of the American stealth helicopter abandoned during the bin Laden raid. Meanwhile, China can help counterbalance Pakistan’s arch-rival, India, including in Afghanistan. Pakistan seems keen to foster the impression that new tensions with America might nudge it even closer towards China. In his blustery speech to parliament on May 9 th Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani struck out on an odd tangent to praise China as an “all- weather friend”, providing Pakistan with strength and inspiration. Not to be outdone, President Asif Zardari issued an effusive statement of his own about a friendship “not matched by any other relationship between two sovereign countries”. But if Islamabad is worried about falling out with Washington and hopes to get more out of Beijing, it may be in for disappointment. According to Zhu Feng of Peking University, such calculations based on “the traditional mentality of power politics” are misplaced. China’s robust, longstanding ties with Pakistan stand on their own merits, he says, and owe nothing to America’s standing in Pakistan. Both China and America want a stable Pakistan. For all that, China’s dealings with Pakistan have always been conducted with one eye on India. Last year Beijing chose to supply Pakistan with two new civilian nuclear reactors, even though the deal appeared to violate Chinese non-proliferation commitments. It was a boon not only for Pakistan’s energy- starved economy. It was, as Mr Zhu points out, also a way for China to counterbalance a controversial nuclear deal reached earlier between America and India. China and Pakistan have a lustily growing trade relationship, worth almost $9 billion last year. China provides military gear, including fighter jets and frigates. Some Chinese infrastructure projects in Pakistan have strategic implications. They include ports on the Arabian Sea and a proposed rail project which has yet to be approved, but which would arouse controversy, and Indian ire, by running through contested territory in Kashmir. Still, China’s commitment to Pakistan has its limits. After devastating floods last year, America gave Pakistan $690 m, 28 % of all international aid. China’s contribution was a mere $18m. According to Andrew Small of the German Marshall Fund, an American policy institute, Pakistan may be “ talking up the ‘China option’ beyond where the Chinese are willing to go.” China, he reckons, will be reluctant to tilt too far towards what might look like an anti-India alliance”. Despite border disagreements, China wants to keep its relations with India in reasonable order. What is more, Pakistan’s chronic instability and its failure, whether by design or incompetence, to suppress extremism make Pakistan as hard a partner for China to trust as for America. “Sweeter than honey” may be plenty sweet enough.

Demanding Answers From Pakistan

SINCE the 9 /11 attacks, Pakistan has behaved toward US as both friend and adversary--and gotten away with it. The latest evidence of its duplicity is the revelation that Osama bin Laden lived for years in a house near Pakistan's national military academy and a local branch of its intelligence service without any evident interference. Even before the American raid last week on bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan had a huge credibility problem. It provides arms and safe haven for Afghan insurgent groups and pays their commanders to carry out attacks, but denies doing so. In the broader war on terrorism, Pakistan says it is completely on our side. In fact, its record is very uneven. It has been helpful in arresting some high-value Qaeda operatives and has allowed US to wage Predator drone attacks. But it has refused to move decisively against groups that Washington regards as terrorists and has put limits on American unilateral operations. It is not surprising, then, that no one took Pakistan's protestations of innocence after the discovery of bin Laden seriously. The killing of bin Laden only 60 miles from Islamabad, its capital, has put Pakistan on the defensive, and the nature of our strike capability is not lost on Pakistani leaders and their terrorist and insurgent clients. With American influence now at its peak and our troops still at full strength in Afghanistan, we have the leverage to force Pakistan to reconsider. US should pursue a two-stage strategy. First, we should formally present any information about Pakistani complicity in shielding bin Laden to Pakistan's leaders. Then we should follow up with demands that Pakistan break the backbone of al-Qaeda in Pakistan by moving against figures like bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri; remove limits on the Predator drone campaign; uproot insurgent sanctuaries and shut down factories that produce bombs for use against American and Afghan soldiers; and support a reasonable political settlement in Afghanistan. Such a settlement would ensure that Afghanistan does not become a haven for terrorists again, allay Pakistan's legitimate security concerns and provide amnesty-- and allow political participation-- for insurgents who lay down their arms and accept the Afghan constitution. In pursuing these goals, US should undertake a major diplomatic campaign, involving regional players like China and Saudi Arabia. If Pakistan fulfills these demands, US should reward it with long-term commitments of assistance, through trade benefits, programmes run by the World Bank and US Agency for International Development and similar efforts to promote development and education. But if Pakistan refuses to cooperate, US must put an end to its duplicity. First, US should reduce its dependence on supply lines running through Pakistan to Afghanistan. We should expand alternative supply routes through Azerbaijan and other countries in Central Asia. Also, as we draw down forces in Afghanistan, our logistical requirements will diminish; this will give US more leeway to consider unilateral attacks against terrorists and insurgents in Pakistan. Second, US should stay on the course set by Obama to build, train and support Afghan security forces and reduce our own military presence while retaining the capacity to provide air support, intelligence collection and other capabilities that the Afghans currently lack. Such a posture can strengthen Afghanistan against Pakistani interference and help persuade Pakistan to embrace a settlement. Third, US should conclude a longer- term agreement with Afghanistan to maintain a small, enduring military presence that would give us the capability to conduct counterterrorism operations and respond to possibilities--like Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands-- of extremists. Fourth, US could consider seeking a UN Security Council resolution to authorise an investigation into how bin Laden managed to hide in plain view. The inquiry should examine the presence of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations in Pakistan. This strategy requires an improvement in the troubled relationship between US and Afghanistan. The impending arrivals of a new American ambassador, Ryan C. Crocker, and commander, Lt. Gen. John R. Allen of the Marine Corps, provide an opportunity to make progress. The challenge for the Afghan leadership and the new team is to achieve a partnership in which US sustains its commitment at much lower cost over time, while Afghanistan does its part by improving governance and the rule of law. It is in neither America's interest nor Pakistan's for relations to become more adversarial. But Pakistan's strategy of being both a friend and an adversary is no longer acceptable. While the killing of bin Laden was an important success, a greater achievement would be to transform US-Pak relations into a true partnership that fights terrorism, advances a reasonable Afghan settlement and helps stabilise the region. The writer is a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations during the George W. Bush administration.

Banker To The Poor And Microfinance Pioneer Forced To Resign

THE DECISION of Nobel laureate Mohammad Yunus to give in to government pressure and step down from the Grameen Bank should not be seen as a victory for opponents of microfinance. Mr. Yunus is the victim of a mean- spirited campaign, and of the complicated internal politics of Bangladesh. He resigned as the bank’s managing director, as he said in a statement this week, to prevent more damage being done to the bank he founded 34 years ago, and to its 8.3 million customers. The Bangladeshi government moved against Mr. Yunus on the grounds of corruption, accusing him of spending years “sucking the blood of the poor.” However, the facts do not support that conclusion. Microfinance, which offers small loans to poor people who lack access to formal financial institutions, has proven to be an effective poverty-alleviation tool, despite recent criticisms of usury. Interest rates are high because of the high cost of collecting payments on millions of tiny loans. The Grameen Bank, which has lent $10.3- billion since its founding, boasts a 97- per-cent loan-recovery rate. Most of the borrowers are women. The Bangladeshi government may well be resentful of the bank’s prestige and influence, and of Mr. Yunus’s abortive attempt to establish a political party in 2007. In India, the government has cracked down on micro-lenders in the state of Andhra Pradesh, following the suicide of several borrowers who became overly indebted after seeking loans from multiple micro-creditors. As the industry develops, more regulations and checks and balances may be needed. However, reforms and new regulatory frameworks are possible without vilifying the industry’s dedicated founder. Unless the Bangladeshi government knows something it has not yet made public, Mr. Yunus, who will continue fighting unproven allegations against him through the courts, will survive this crisis, reputation intact.

PAKISTAN AFTER BIN LADEN : Humiliation Of The Army Men

AMERICA’S killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2nd brought with it a rare chance to ease the Pakistani army’s unhealthy grip on the country’s domestic and foreign affairs. The generals have floundered since the raid in Abbottabad, unsettled by accusations of complicity with bin Laden or, if not, then incompetence. It has not helped that video clips show bin Laden apparently active as al-Qaeda’s leader in his last years. Pakistanis cannot agree what is more shocking, that bin Laden had skulked in a military town so close to the capital, Islamabad, or that Americans nipped in to kill him without meeting the least resistance. Either way, they know to blame the humiliated men in uniform. Columnists and bloggers even call for army bosses to fall on their swagger sticks. Ashfaq Kayani, the now sullen-faced head of the armed forces, and his more exposed underling, Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who runs the main military spy outfit, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), are unused to such cheek. Their spokesmen have fumbled to come up with a consistent line. They have claimed both that Pakistan abhorred America’s attack and helped to bring it about. Army inaction on the night was because someone forgot to turn on the radar, or because it only worked pointing east at India. And General Pasha would, and then certainly would not, fly to America to smooth things over. That disarray gave elected leaders a chance. Neither President Asif Zardari nor Yusuf Raza Gilani, the prime minister, deludes himself that he is really in charge. Nor do outsiders. Just after they had killed bin Laden, the Americans first telephoned General Kayani, not the president. In the past year both Generals Kayani and Pasha have had their spells in office extended beyond their usual terms, without a squeak from the brow-beaten civilians. The armed forces scoop up roughly a quarter of all public spending and large dollops of aid, with no proper oversight, says Ayesha Siddiqa, a defence analyst. They also run big firms, employ over 500 ,000 , grab prime land for retired officers, set foreign and counterterrorism policies and scotch peace overtures to India. They are racing to expand a nuclear arsenal beyond 100 warheads—Pakistan will soon be the world’s fifth-biggest nuclear power and has been a chief proliferator. Civilian silence thus spoke volumes. Rather than try to defend the army, both elected leaders found pressing needs to be out-of-town. Eventually, on May 9 th, Mr Gilani did tell parliament of the army’s fight against terrorists. He announced an inquiry into the bin Laden affair and said that, as ever, most problems were caused by America. Yet his careful vow of “full confidence in the high command” of the army and the ISI mostly emphasised their loss of prestige, as did a promise that on May 13 th General Kayani would explain to parliament what had gone wrong. The dismayed generals have sniped back. General Kayani told fellow officers that the civilian response had been “insufficient”. Public figures with army links, notably Shah Mehmood Qureshi, a former foreign minister, and Imran Khan, a former cricketer and rising conservative politician, said the president and prime minister should quit. Adding to the squeeze are the Americans. President Barack Obama talked again on May 8 th of bin Laden’s “support network” in Pakistan, a sign he has not yet ruled out ISI complicity. His officials sought (and reportedly got) access to three of bin Laden’s widows found in the Abbottabad compound. They also want to go back to the compound, to get back bits of a helicopter abandoned in the raid. Above all, they want the names of all the ISI men who worked on al-Qaeda. Pakistani security men say it is ridiculous to suspect any complicity: they are at war with al-Qaeda, have arrested 40 of its leaders, and suffered violent attacks, including on ISI offices and the army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi. But Americans point to a refusal to prepare a campaign against the Haqqani network, an al-Qaeda ally, in North Waziristan. They also note the ISI’s longstanding ties to the Afghan Taliban, including its leader, Mullah Omar, who is assumed to be operating out of Quetta in Baluchistan. Perhaps American special forces will now go after him. As it is, despite strenuous efforts by America’s chief-of-staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, relations have been strained for ages. Ordinary Pakistanis have long resented American drone attacks on Afghan insurgents sheltering in their country. American and Pakistani spy agencies fell out last year as dozens of CIA men arrived without ISI oversight to hunt extremists in towns like Abbottabad. Relations only got worse in January, when police arrested a CIA contractor after he had shot two men dead in Lahore. The Americans remain bitter that normal diplomatic levers failed for weeks to free him. The row rumbles on. This week some media, presumably fed by the ISI, outed the CIA station chief in Islamabad by giving his name. The same happened five months ago to his predecessor. On May 16 th is another test, as a trial opens in Chicago of Tahawwur Rana, accused of helping a Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, who struck Mumbai in November 2008. Among others indicted (though still at large) is a suspected ISI officer, “Major Iqbal”, who is accused of helping to plan and fund the attacks which killed 170. Generals Kayani and Pasha are struggling to calibrate their response. Both congratulated Marc Grossman, America’s regional envoy, for bin Laden’ s killing when they met a few hours after the raid. In public, by contrast, General Kayani growled that America was trampling on Pakistan and must reduce its “footprint”. Over military aid, they grumble that needed helicopters and fighter jets are held back. And to show that Pakistan has other options, Mr Gilani is to visit China, its “all- weather friend”, on May 17th (see article ). Relations with America can only get so bad, however. General Mahmud Ali Durrani, ambassador to Washington until 2008 , thinks the problem is that neither side speaks frankly. Rather than pretend that it will campaign in the wilds of North Waziristan, the Pakistani army should spell out how operationally hard that would be. And the Americans should set out the evidence for why they say the ISI collaborates with extremists. Although the bin Laden raid has rocked the relationship, few predict a full break in ties. Not only will America need to get precious supplies to Afghanistan, mainly via the Pakistani port of Karachi, for years to come, but it is wary of isolating or destabilising a country with such a fast-growing nuclear arsenal. In turn Pakistan, with a decrepit economy, needs international aid. And it frets at signs of America falling in with its old rival, India. So the two sides are stuck with each other. As a former foreign minister says, America has concluded that Pakistanis are rascals, but at least they are “still our rascals”.