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Monday, December 5, 2011

Winning The Battle, Losing The War; The US And Pakistan

When former foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said this weekend that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not safe under President Asif Ali Zardari, he almost certainly did not mean that the nuclear arsenal is not secure. The nuclear weapons have little to do with the civilian government; they are guarded ferociously by the Pakistan Army both against terrorist attacks and any foreign or U.S. attempt to seize them, and, as a matter of pride for Pakistanis chafing at any American suggestions otherwise,  safeguarded to international standards.

Rather it was a rhetorical device to attack the government at a rally where Qureshi announced he was joining the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) , the party of former cricket star Imran Khan, a rising force in Pakistani politics.  Qureshi’s assertion tapped into growing anti-Americanism, and a populist view that the  civilian government led by the Pakistan People’s Party, to which he once belonged, had somehow sold the country’s honour – in this case symbolised by nuclear weapons – in return for American aid.  (Pakistan first agreed its uneasy alliance with the United States under former military ruler Pervez Musharraf.)

Yet it is a measure of how distorted and narrow political discourse has become within Pakistan that Qureshi might use the safety of nuclear weapons to attack the government. That political discourse, difficult even at the best of times, is likely to become even narrower in the fury which has followed the NATO airstrikes which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on the border with Afghanistan on Saturday. 

The attack, which Pakistan says was unprovoked and NATO described as a “tragic, unintended incident”, has outraged Pakistanis who have already endured thousands of casualties in a war they believe was forced on them by the United States.

Underneath the confusion about the aims and course of the Afghan war, lies a deep sense of hurt that Pakistani lives are somehow less valued than American lives, and a painful loss of pride over the country’s inability to defend its territory from attacks by a foreign, and apparently hostile, power – whether from airstrikes, drones, or even the May raid by U.S. forces who killed Osama bin Laden.

The result is a society which is being shaped by the Afghan war in ways which neither Pakistan’s neighbours, nor western powers, would choose.  The airstrikes, coming soon after the forced resignation of Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani for allegedly seeking American help to curb the power of the military, have added fresh oxygen to a combustible mix of anti-Americanism and religious nationalism enveloping Pakistan.  Haqqani denies the allegation, but the so-called “Memogate” scandal has badly weakened the civilian government, while the airstrikes have rallied the country behind the army.

In such an environment, there is little room for a discourse that might suggest Pakistanis should also be outraged at the deaths of civilians blown up by suicide bombers sent by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and therefore discuss ways to turn decisively against Islamist militants. Nor is there space for a realistic political debate on how Pakistan should manage its foreign relations that goes beyond a hatred of America and an illusory faith in China’s readiness to ride to the rescue. 

Before the latest crisis, the government  had been pushing through legislative reforms to help democracy take root in Pakistan. It is difficult to see these making much more progress now as the government fights for survival. The tedious mechanics of documenting the economy, as a first step towards increasing the tax base and raising revenues, dropped off the political agenda long ago.

Expectations that the civilian government could become the first in Pakistan’s history to complete its term and be replaced by another democratically elected government are being lowered by the day as the politicians descend into the kind of internecine feuds typical of the 1990s. That decade ended in Musharraf’s military coup in 1999. 

The next casualty of the rising tide of nationalism could well be Pakistan’s warming ties with India – one of the few relationships in the region that until now had been going well.   The civilian government had eased itself into the driving seat in pushing for improved trade relations with India, though no one would suggest that it made the progress it did without the approval of the Pakistan Army. It has a particular interest in better ties with India - the army has drawn its power from a perceived need to defend the country against an Indian threat, contributing to Pakistan’s civilian-military imbalance. 

So when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yusuf Raza Gilani joined each other in early April to watch the Pakistan-India cricket semi-final in the town of Mohali,  they discussed a Pakistani appeal that India drop its opposition to an EU duty waiver on Pakistani textiles exports.  By the end of April, it was becoming clear that improved trade ties could be a game-changer.  (Pakistan had earlier resisted improving trade without first settling the Kashmir dispute.)  By early November, New Delhi agreed to the EU duty waiver and, more significantly, Pakistan granted Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India.

That mood has changed.  Reports have begun to surface in the Pakistani media that the army has reservations about granting MFN status to India. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the humanitarian wing of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group,  and an organisation close to the military,  has launched protests against granting India MFN status, saying that the Kashmir dispute must be settled first. 

After the NATO airstrikes, a JuD protest to mourn the Pakistani soldiers killed turned quickly into a protest against improved trade ties with India. While the government may yet be able to push ahead with its India agenda – albeit on a very tight military leash – the signs are not looking good.

Progress in relations with India had become – quite unexpectedly – one of the few release valves left to ease off the pressures building up within Pakistan.  On its western border, the United States and its allies are pushing ahead with an agenda in Afghanistan which has already integrated the possibility there will be no early peace settlement with Afghan insurgents - an idea long sought by Pakistan.   And while Pakistan won some initial sympathy from foreign governments over the NATO airstrikes, its decision to boycott next week’s international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, will - at least symbolically – highlight its isolation. It is beginning to look like a country turning in on itself in dangerous ways.

We have always known there was a risk that Pakistan could become to Afghanistan what Cambodia was to Vietnam - a country horribly destabilised by an American war spilling across its borders.  We are not there yet. Perhaps those who say all will be well when the United States leaves the region will prove right – American influence for decades has tended to be toxic to Pakistan.

Sunday, December 4, 2011

Is 'Tipaimukh' Tangle Making Headway?

Two advisers to the prime minister -- Dr. Gauhar Rizvi and Dr. Mashiur Rahman -- have met with the Indian prime minister Dr. Monmohan Singh in New Delhi. They conveyed Bangladesh's concern and anxiety caused by the "Tipaimukh" project in the upstream of the Indian north-eastern state of Manipur. The issue is very much talked-about in

Bangladesh, particularly in the recent days in the aftermath of the reports that the Indian government is going ahead with the project, "disregarding" Dhaka's sentiments surrounding it.

Evidently, a sort of national clamour is discernible in Bangladesh over the issue with both the government and the opposition as well civil societies and environmental forums, giving vent to their feelings on the project. People in the country are increasingly veering towards the view that the "Tipaimukh" will bring disaster of a colossal proportion to Bangladesh in many fields and it is imperative that the project is not implemented, at least not in the manner in which it is being done, for the sake of the interest of lower riparian Bangladesh and not less importantly, greater interest of the friendship and cordiality between two close neighbours.

New Delhi has assured Dhaka repeatedly that it would not do anything that would harm Bangladesh's interest. But reports that India is going ahead with the project, have sparked off a concern of serious proportion in Bangladesh. It is against this background that two advisers to the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina rushed to the Indian capital. They held talks with the concerned key persons there and also met the prime minister of India in this regard.

Two advisers are certainly very much relevant to this particular area as Dr. Rizvi is dealing with matters relating to foreign affairs and Dr. Rahman, with economic issues. It goes without saying that both of them are, thus, deeply involved in the nitty-gritty of the Indo-Bangladesh bilateral ties and related matters.

Admittedly, varying views exist in the country about such a role of the "advisers" as they are not "elected" and not "responsible" to the people. But the fact remains that the advisers are quite important and two advisers who had gone to New Delhi are playing here an important role. Both have sound educational and other background, making them otherwise quite suitable for the key role, albeit the controversies involving them.

They held talks when the "Tipaimukh" issue is raising a lot of storm in Bangladesh; their fleeting visit to the Indian capital shows that the government is not sitting idle on the matter. Water Resources Minister Ramesh Chandra Sen said that if necessary, Bangladesh will go to the international forums for realising its legitimate rights on the issue.

So much so is the heat being generated by the issue that Prime minister Sheikh Hasina said at any cost Dhaka's interest would be protected. Leader of the opposition Khaleda Zia has blamed the government for its "failure" to protect national interest on the issue and she has also written a letter to the Indian prime minister on the matter. Even former president H.M. Ershad, whose "Jatiya Party" is a constituent of the ruling "Mahajote" (Grand Alliance) coalition, is set to lead an agitation on the "Tipaimukh" issue.

Certainly, two advisers to the Bangladesh prime minister spared no efforts to convince India for persuading it from implementing the project. Dr. Manmohan Singh reiterated his country's position that nothing would be done that would "harm" Bangladesh. It is not clearly known what concrete result has emerged out of their parleys in New Delhi.

Understandably, the entire area of greater Sylhet and also of the districts of Kishoreganj, Netrakona and Brahmmanbaria, and some other areas will be badly affected in many ways if the project is implemented. Some quarters in Manipur itself are apprehensive of the adverse effect of "Tipaimukh", although it is stated by others that it would bring manifold benefits.

The Indian prime minister, both during the visit of Bangladesh prime minister to New Delhi in January, 2010 and his own one to Dhaka in September this year, spoke in the same tone that New Delhi values friendship with Bangladesh and his country would not do anything that would cause any damage to the interests of a very friendly nation. He has reiterated the same this time, too.

Anyone, having an understanding of the chemistry of the Indian politics, may agree that component states their enjoy certain independence, regardless of what the federal authority in New Delhi thinks about those matters that concern them. Besides, the Indian political milieu, especially centre's ties with a particular state government, is also a factor in deciding things.

The "Teesta" water issue is a pointer in this regard. But it is not meant to say that the federal government in New Delhi is totally helpless, as it does otherwise seem to be the case at times. What is necessary is the commitment and sincerity on part of the federal authority to assert itself with regard to sharing of the common river water-related matters with Bangladesh for the larger sake of friendship that India has been espousing and especially when governments in both nations are strongly bound by traditional cordiality.

A formal accord among the concerned agencies in India was signed in New Delhi last month for implementation of the "Timaipumk" project. That is being considered by different circles in Bangladesh as a "breach of trust" as Dhaka was not informed about that beforehand, at all. The joint survey and other activities from the Indian side is imperative for assuaging the deep concerns of Bangladesh and failure to do this would not certainly serve the purpose of close neighbourliness.

BY : Zaglul Ahmed Chowdhury.
 

Friday, December 2, 2011

Delhi’s Betrayal And Dhaka’s Incredible Reaction Over Tipaimukh

Well known and acclaimed Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar called the Indian decision to construct the Tippaimukh Dam a break of trust. He then wrote a scathing article in one of the leading newspapers of Dhaka where he blamed India for failing to match Bangladesh on the major concessions that Prime Minster Sheikh Hasina made to India. Teesta to him was a major disappointment and now the decision on Tippaimukh is a letdown of major significance.

The Indian journalist also wrote that Sheikh Hasina’s popularity is on a sharp decline. Indian letdown is adding to her current predicament. He however felt that despite the Indian letdown, the anti-Indian feelings in Bangladesh have not increased. He gave high marks to Sheikh Hasina for her firm commitment to secularism.

Hasina’s political risk
Sheikh Hasina had taken great political risks by giving India assurances from day one of her tenure against terrorism and insurgency and subsequently by handing over the ULFA terrorists to India, albeit secretly. Bangladesh also offered India land transit early in Sheikh Hasina’s present tenure that has gone to operation on a trial basis recently. At literally the 11th hour, indeed the evening before the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Dhaka, the Indians withdrew from the table the agreement on the Teesta after assuring Bangladesh that the deal would be the icing on the cake for celebrating the success of the Indian Prime Minister’s visit. Thus the visit of the Indian Prime Minister ended disappointingly.

Now the news about the Tippaimukh Dam and the manner in which the Indians have treated Bangladesh when it sought news on the Dam has added salt to the injury. It is not that the Indians did not know the bipartisan feelings in Bangladesh against the Tippaimukh Dam or fears about it. The recent earthquake of major significance in Sikkim close to Bangladesh has only enhanced public concerns and fears over the Tippaimukh Dam.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had more than convincingly communicated this to the Indian Government during her official visit to New Delhi in January, 2010. Her concerns and those of Bangladesh were duly reflected in the Joint Communiqué of that visit. The Indian Prime Minister again acknowledged the concerns of Bangladesh when he spoke to a cross section of Bangladesh’s intelligentsia in Dhaka University.
 
Thus the news that India would build the dam has caused widespread concern and anger in Bangladesh. The Prime Minister herself vowed that she and her government would not allow the Indians to do anything that would harm Bangladesh. She announced in parliament that she would send a Special Envoy to India to discuss with the Indians the concerns of Bangladesh on the Tippaimukh Dam.
 
Unbelievable Govt. stance
Yet against the Prime Minister’s stand, strange as it may seem, there have been some unbelievable statements in the press from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Water Resources. The State Minister of Water Resources in an interview to a local TV station said that it is India’s internal matter whether or not it decides to construct a dam at Tippaimukh. He then went to say something absolutely incredible. He said that India has the right to do whatever it pleases with any of the international rivers we share with it as the lower riparian. By his incredible stand he gave away Bangladesh’s rights under international laws and conventions of waters of all rivers flowing to Bangladesh from India! He said that the opposition is playing politics with the issue of Tippaimukh.

The Foreign Ministry, instead of contradicting the suicidal comments of the State Minister, backed him instead. In a press interview at the MFA, the Foreign Minister thought that the hue and cry raised over the Tippaimukh Dam are unwarranted and that it is part of the opposition ploy to fiddle in troubled waters. She assured the nation that there is no reason to doubt Indian intentions. India, she has no doubt, would not harm Bangladesh. The Foreign Secretary also joined his Minister and addressed the media to assure that India can and must be trusted!

There is clearly a major disconnect between the Prime Minister and her team. By implication, her team is telling her that she too should have full trust in India! They are not bothered that India has dismissed our concern over Tippaimukh by a curt reply to go to the MEA’s website for details about the dam. To them, trusting India is more important than finding out, first why India chose to go ahead with the dam without informing Bangladesh and second, whether or not the dam when eventually built would harm Bangladesh!

The Indian arrogance has infuriated many well known Indians like Kuldip Nayyar. Yet such arrogance has not had any impact on our team that is currently dealing with India. In fact, they are, accepting each act of Indian betrayal as proof of Indian friendship and concern for us. They have given to India the guardianship to decide our interests and have written our rights off even to question Indian intent.

The outcome of all these are going to take Bangladesh and India at directions of conflict instead of friendship. Kuldip Nayyar is right in expressing his concerns at Indian attitude that is causing Bangladesh-India relations to fall apart and pushing the ruling party on a steep decline politically. . He is however mistaken in thinking that it is not causing anti-Indian feelings to grow. In fact, today, the anti-Indian feelings are growing faster than Kuldip Nayyar may be willing to admit.

Indian arrogance is rendering justification to the BNP’s anti-Indian stance in politics that could have been contained if the Indians had not been as insensible and insensitive as they have been. Many in the AL camp are also beginning to question Indian intentions. In the process, a great widow of opportunity opened by Sheikh Hasina upon assuming power for a paradigm shift in Bangladesh-India relations is also being wasted.
 
Hidden agenda
A former colleague with first hand experience about Bangladesh-India relations asked me bluntly why India first aborted the Teesta agreement and now unilaterally went ahead with Tippaimukh fully aware that it would place a government both covertly and overtly out to please it in political trouble. I had no answer except blame it upon the dynamics of domestic politics in India. He disagreed. He said firmly that the Indians have some hidden agenda for which they are subjecting the Bangladesh Government to pressure. He had me thinking. Is India changing sides aware that the Government, as Kuldip Nayyar has written, has made a mess of governance? Or is India trying to force this government to sign some agreement with which it could hold the next government responsible to serve its interests?

There is a postscript to Bangladesh’s absurd ways of negotiating with India. The Minister for Water Ramesh Chandra Sen has said Bangladesh would take India to the international court for protecting its interests! Does he know what his Deputy has said in public or the trust that the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Secretary has in India? Perhaps not. Our negotiators are behaving like children lost in a maze without grasp of reality in their pursuit to please India at any cost.

BY :  M. Serajul Islam.
 

Pakistan: Between The Devil And The Deep Sea

On Nove-mber 25, less than 24 hours after the Nato commander in Afghanistan met Gen. Kayani in Islamabad to discuss matters related to the Pak-Afghan border, troops at a Pakistani border check post at Salala became targets of Nato fire that killed twenty-four of them. This was by far the deadliest incident of its kind, although not the first. A similar strike in September 2010 took the lives of two soldiers and another in June 2008 killed 11.

The incident couldn't have happened at a worst phase, both in the so called GOWT in Afghanistan and in the state of US-Pakistan bilateral relationship. Pakistan has reacted predictably. Strategically significant is its decision to close the Nato supply route to Afghanistan and ask the US to vacate the Shamsi Airbase Baluchistan used by the US as a base for drone attacks on militants in FATA. And Pakistan has expressed its intention to bring under review the entire gamut of Pak-US relationship.

Relationship between the two had had been going from bad to worse for quite sometime. The level of mistrust of Pakistan in the US mind had shot up particularly with the increasing perception about Pakistan's tendency to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. And Pakistan has done very little to remove the impression about its double game-play in Afghanistan. The blame-game on the other hand is seen by some observers as an attempt to shift the responsibility for the US failure in Afghanistan on Pakistan. 

In the backdrop of the US plans of phased withdrawal from Afghanistan the latest incident assumes more significance than merely being a "mistake" for which a "detailed investigation" has been launched. American apology accompanied by the usual excuse of firing in self-defence has been dismissed by Pakistan.

The real question is not whether the relationship will be derailed but what will be the extent of the setback and the consequent impact of it on not only the future of Pak-US ties but also on the strategic equation in the region and the global war on terror. Some have even gone so far as to ask whether this is a prelude to an US intervention in Pakistan. 

Perhaps there are basically three options open to Pakistan and each of them in its own way bears heavily on how things turn out in the future.

Firstly, Pakistan can choose to go along with the process of inquiry that Nato/ISAF have promised with the hope that, as one analyst suggests, the crisis will get "papered over," but with the distinct possibility that the "U.S. will face even less prospect that Pakistan will really crackdown on insurgent groups in the border area." The sense of outrage in Pakistan is much too deep for the government to allow it to die down. And given that the GWOT has no public support in Pakistan, anything that looks as compromise risks not only the future of the government but may well ignite a serious upheaval in the country that is likely to be exploited by the religious extremists. That is a situation that neither the people of Pakistan nor the US would like to see happen. Therefore, for the Pakistan government, "just to grin and bear it" as suggested by some, is just not an option. 

The second option is to reassess the pattern of relationship with the US, as has been repeatedly stated by the Pakistani prime minister. The situation in Afghanistan is in a very critical state and the US is fully aware of the imperative of Pakistan's role in stabilising the situation. By the same token it cannot be lost on Pakistan that it is Afghanistan that makes it relevant to the US and that twice in three decades the developments in Afghanistan had brought the two countries together as strategic partners. The first being the erstwhile Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan starting in December 1979, and the second being the Coalition invasion of the same country under the banner of "Operation Enduring Freedom" starting October 2001. 

Pakistan is still suffering the consequence of the first foreign intervention in Afghanistan and is grappling with the problem of how to emerge unscathed from the second. Therefore, what will be the character of their ties after reassessment is a matter of conjecture. But no Pakistani policy maker can either overlook history or Pakistan's strategic compulsions in composing its strategic narrative. 

The third possible option is de-linking from GWOT. Given the deep dependence of the US on Pakistan's support in pursuing its campaign in Afghanistan this option has ominous consequences for Pakistan. US' need for unhindered supply through Pakistan, although there are other alternatives, and for operational intelligence and admin support, may force the US to take any step to ensure Pakistan's cooperation, at least till it withdraws completely from Afghanistan. What might be the form of that persuasion is left to the readers' imagination. 

The Pak-US conundrum has come to such a pass that it is perhaps time for Pakistan to choose between the devil and the deep sea. One wonders which is the better of the two. 

BY :   

India In Breach Of Its Obligations

Rivers are gifts of nature and their flow knows no territorial boundaries. Human beings and rivers have symbiotic relations. Water is life and water sustains nature with all its bounties.
India proposes to build a dam (39-metre long and 162.5 metre high) on the Barak River at Tipaimukh near Manipur-Mizoram border, off Bangladesh Zakiganj border in Sylhet, for generating 1,500MW hydropower. 

The trans-boundary Barak River enters Bangladesh near Amalshid of Sylhet, where it is bifurcated -- with one branch becoming the Surma River and the other the Kushiara River. Both the rivers unite in Habiganj district and flow down as the Kalni River. The Kalni River meets with Ghorautra River near Bajitpur of Kishoreganj district to become the Meghna River.

The Barak River and Meghna River belong to a common basin. Therefore, any interference in natural flow of in any segment of the river will have an impact on the other segments of the river.
During the visit of Bangladesh prime minister in January 2010, India's prime minister gave assurance that "India will not take steps on the Tipaimukh project that would adversely impact Bangladesh." This was reiterated when the Indian prime minister visited Dhaka last September.

On October 22, the Indian Union government concluded an agreement (promoter's agreement as India calls it) with the purpose of setting up a joint venture company between the government of Manipur, NHPC Ltd and Sutlej Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd. 

The signing of the agreement has not only surprised the people of Bangladesh but also caused deep resentment because, given the prevailing trustful atmosphere, India did not inform the Bangladesh government of its recent steps, let alone share relevant information on the project.

On November 22, the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement urging India to "share all relevant details of the proposed project in full transparency and also about any further step that it may take in connection with the project….. Bangladesh, as a co-riparian, would like to underscore the need for prior consultations before there is any intervention on common rives like the Barak."

On November 23, the Bangladesh prime minister reportedly said in the Parliament: "It cannot be that one country will unilaterally conduct a survey on Tipaimukh dam." The prime minister hit the nail on the head on the subject and said she would send a special envoy to New Delhi.

The Indian prime minister's assurance, that India "will not take steps on the Tipaimukh project that would adversely impact Bangladesh," means that only a joint study of experts from both countries can come to that conclusion. They will examine, among others, the impact of geographic, geological, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors on both countries.

A study in 2005 by the Bangladesh Institute of Water Modeling suggests that during a drier monsoon season, when Bangladesh will need water for cultivation and fisheries, the dam will hold 27% more water in June, 16% in July, 14% in August and 4% in September, than an average monsoon year.
Another hydrological impact study in Bangladesh suggests that if India builds Tipaimukh dam on the Barak River, 26% of haors (wetlands) in Sylhet and around 11% in Moulvibazar will run dry.

One noted Bangladesh water expert says that it has been a common characteristic of dams that they increase water inflow in summer, which may cause flash floods in the Sylhet region during the harvesting time of boro (April-May). Furthermore, the geological structure of the region is like a bowl, where water gets stuck for a longer period than it does on the plains. If the water inflow becomes irregular, it will hinder agriculture.
The proposed dam will be adjacent to the well-recognised Taithu fault. Many experts say a major earthquake may cause the failure of the dam. Generally, a dam-break wave travels at a minimum velocity of 10km per hour and is expected to reach Bangladesh in a short time, which would be catastrophic.

On Tipaimukh dam, it is reported that Dr. Soibam Ibotombi of the Department of Earth Sciences, Manipur University, (India), in an article, said that the "Tipaimukh dam is a geo-tectonic blunder of international dimensions." 

Another academic Dr. R. K. Ranjan Singh, former Associate Professor of Earth Sciences at Manipur University, now chairman of the Citizen Concern for Dams and Development, reportedly warned of potential earthquake dangers to the dam and told the media: "The area of the dam zone is rated five and therefore if the water in the upper catchments is dammed, it may actually increase the chances of triggering a seismic event."
Besides the above, it is strongly argued that India will be in breach of its obligations if it proceeds unilaterally with the project because of the following reasons:
* It goes against the preamble (Paragraph 6), Article 2 (common basin management of common rivers) and Article 6 (collaboration on preservation of common eco-systems), of the recent Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development between India and Bangladesh signed last September during the Indian prime minister's visit to Dhaka; 

* It is contrary to the spirit of the preambular paragraph of the 1996 the Indo-Bangladesh Ganges Water Treaty, (in particular, Paragraph 4), wherein it stipulates that water resources of the two countries should be utilised for the "mutual benefit of the peoples of the two countries;"

* The dam goes against the 1989 ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Article 6 of the Convention). It came into force in 1991 and is binding on all ILO member-countries, including India;
* It is contrary to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. The Convention recognises that the conservation of biological diversity is "a common concern of humankind;"
* India will violate customary and conventional international laws if it does not hold consultations with Bangladesh before any project is undertaken on the Barak River.

Finally, if India goes ahead unilaterally, it will be generating only 1,500MW from the Tipaimukh dam at the cost of friendship of Bangladesh people when, according to Indian water expert B.G. Verghese, India can generate 54,000 MW from the Tsangpo/ Brahmaputra which falls 2,450 metres (8,000 feet) over a few kilometres in China just before it reaches the Indian border and Assam.

Given the state of knowledge and technology of various sources of energy, India's proposed construction of Tipaimukh dam for hydropower is baffling, and it is highly desirable that India take a pioneering role in pursuing the "ecological approach" in harvesting trans-boundary Rivers that flow into Bangladesh.

BY :