All that being part of history now, one wonders how it all happened, who did it, and why? While that is precisely the undertaking of the investigators who will unearth the real intent of the carnage and identify the culprits, the incident demonstrates a serious lapse in military intelligence . The following facts, gathered from over a dozen of reliable sources, further corroborate that fact. One: Investigators have learnt that a team of 25 trained foreign commandos entered Bangladesh illegally from India through various bordering areas on or within January 11 , 2009. They were received and sheltered in Dhaka by individuals working under cover as diplomats. Two: At the same time, a small group of 10-12 BDR members, including two Deputy Assistant Directors ( DADs), were recruited as the internal moles and coordinators to provide precise information to the foreign team via three senior political leaders of the country until the hours of the carnage. Three: The occasion for the operation was chosen carefully to ensure availability of all senior BDR officers who had gathered in Pilkhana for the annual BDR day celebration. Over 3 ,000 extra troops also came to Pilkhana for various administrative duties as well as to launch a tattoo show for which the BDR has been historically famous. Four: The mutiny was slated for February 24 , while the PM was in Pilkhana to take salute in the BDR day parade. In consideration of likely collateral harm to the political personalities and other dignitaries who accompanied the PM, the date was changed. However, final coordination and reconnaissance were done that day by some guests who attended the parade, masquerading as VIPs. Five: Upon conclusion of final reconnaissance, at about 10.30 PM, on February 24 , a segment of the foreign killing squad and over 25 BDR soldiers - plus three young - leading politicians of the country - met in a briefing in one of suburban Dhaka residences. The precise timing of the operation and the responsibilities of each small group were decided in that meeting. Six: As per plan, one of the DADs ensured that members of the BDR cell would be posted on duty on gate number 4 that morning when the DG would sit for the slated Darbar in the Darbar hall. Seven: On February 25 , the D- day, the foreign commando team entered the Pilkhana compound through gate number 4 , at 8.10 AM, using a BDR vehicle ( Bedford ) which the designated DAD had arranged to send for them about an hour ago. Dressed in sports gear (long camouflage trouser, vest, and PT shoe) - in order to be able to quickly change into civil clothes while fleeing after the massacre - the killers entered the Pilkhana compound undetected. Eight: The BDR vehicle that carried the killers was followed by an ash-colour pick up van which carried initially used arms and ammunition from outside. In order to begin the massacre, one of the Bengali speaking commandos, armed, was ordered to enter the Darbar hall without permission to engage the DG into a provoking altercation. Nine: Once the DG was shot, other officers, all unarmed, tried to obstruct the lone killer. Within seconds, the action group of the killer team entered the Darbar hall and started killing other officers while the cover up group cordoned the area. Ten: In the following hours, part B of the mission began by inducting other troops into the team under gun point and the armoury - as well as the intelligence equipments - was looted. The foreign killers and their local henchmen used BDR soldiers on gunpoint to show the locations of other officers, their families, and the offices where vital national security documents remained preserved. Highly classified border security maps, troop deployment plan and initial action plan, etc. were taken away by the foreign commandos. Eleven: Eyewitnesses say, two of the last foreign commandos - one male and one female - left the BDR compound in the afternoon on February 26 , following the surrendering of arms by BDR members who knew nothing about the mutiny even a minute before. These two are presumed to be the leaders of the foreign commando team. None of the above could have been materialized if the two main national intelligence outfits of the country (DGFI and NSI) have had prior clues about what was being conspired to destroy the armed forces of the country. The foreign commandos took control of BDR's own intelligence outfit, RSU, at the initial stage and used RSU equipments to communicate among themselves during the mutiny. The commanding officer of RSU too was assassinated during the carnage. That aside, there were other intelligence lapses during the mutiny. In the more than 30 hours while the mutiny prolonged, neither the NSI, nor the DGFI, had any clue about who were being shot at and what exactly went on inside. They also ignored SMS messages from fellow officers, on ground that there was no order from the government to do anything. In reality, these two agencies were too busy, as they often are, in ensuring security to the VVIPs and VIPs; not the country and its vital institutions that they are oath-bound and mandated to serve and protect
