Mujib Agreed To Release All POWs To Save Bhutto

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his conversation with Henry Kissinger said that he had agreed to the release of all prisoners of war (POWs) because he wanted to save Bhutto from military intervention in Pakistan. "I have done it intentionally. If I had not done this the military would again have come to power in Pakistan," Sheikh Mujib added. The then Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said this to the then US Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger during his visit to Bangladesh on October 30 , 1974 at 5.30 pm at Prime Minister's Secretariat in Dhaka. The content of the discussion remained a classified document at the State Department until October 11 , 2007. The document was released for public on February 14 , 2009. The discussion between Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Henry Kissinger clearly explained under what consideration Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had to release the POWs. Henry Kissinger visited Bangladesh on his way to visit India prior to the visit of the then President Ford of the USA to India. Kissinger was in Bangladesh to study the possibility of President Ford's visit to Bangladesh as it is evidenced from the document. During the discussion the then Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dr Kamal Hossain, Foreign Secretary Fakhruddin Ahmed, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister Ruhul Quddus, Economic Secretary to Prime Minister Dr M Abdus Sattar, another officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abdul Bari represented Bangladesh side. On the American side Ambassador Boster, Assistant Secretary of State Atherton, Robert Oklay of NSC, Ambassador Robert Anderson and Deputy Assistant Secretary Laingen represented the United States. Henry Kissinger appreciated Sheikh Mujib for his farsightedness. Sheikh Mujib said to Kissinger that Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto during his visit to Bangladesh did not agree to share the wealth, and even did not say anything about the repatriation of the Biharis. Bhutto only agreed to set up diplomatic relations without giving anything. During the discussion Mujib repeatedly requested for help and painted a gloomy picture about the famine situation in Bangladesh. Mujib said, "I have set up 5303 food kitchens and we feed 100 , 000 people everyday." Sheikh Mujib also sought Kissinger's help to set up diplomatic relations with China at that time. With an oblique reference to India he also pointed to Kissinger not to discuss with them about Bangladesh. " When you deal with Bangladesh you are dealing with us and not with someone else," Mujib said. The spirit of the discussion can only be understood if any one goes through the document. The text of the discussion between Prime Minister ?ujib and the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of the US is as follows. Prime Minister ? uji? (Mujib): I am grateful to you for finding the time to come here. THE SECRETARY ( Kissinger): You were kind enough to invite me. Mujib: I am glad you could see the love and affection of my people. It is sometimes very difficult to understand our position. Mujib: Once I can associate the issues and personalities of a country by visiting the place, it tells me a great deal that will be helpful to me in the future. It is particularly so when I am received as warmly as I was here. Mujib: We can't give you too much comfort in physical arrangements here. Kissinger: You have been very helpful and the guest house is extremely comfortable and pleasant. We reviewed with your Foreign Minister this afternoon a wide variety of problems. I would be happy to talk about whatever issues interest you most. We reviewed international events and I indicated in what areas we want to be helpful. The progress and development of Bangladesh are matters we have very much in mind. Mujib: You know our stand on these things. Who doesn't know you? As far as I am concerned, I can perhaps discuss Sub-continental matters. Kissinger: That would be very interesting for me. Mujib: I don't like to go into a great deal of background. If you review the history of our pre- independence period, however, you will find that ( the then) East Pakistan earned as much as 75 per cent of Pakistan's foreign exchange. I was a member of the National Constituent Assembly in 1956. You know that background.

Kissinger: What was the population then?


Mujib: In 1947 the population of this area was about 40 million. Again, I don't really like to go into the background of our troubles. But it should be remembered that it was the soil of Bangladesh that suffered in 1971 and not that of Pakistan. I showed Bhutto, when he was here this summer, some of the evidence of this.

Gen. Farman Ali's order I showed him, for example, the order issued by General Farman Ali that " the green land of Bangladesh must be painted red". That was an instruction to his forces. I have that and showed it to Bhutto. We thought the Pakistanis would be generous. But I must be frank with you. Pakistan seeks only diplomatic relations with us. Nothing else. We did our part. We released all the POWs. But then when we want to discuss a division of assets they say nothing. We did not ask for a concrete assurance of assets but we ask that they give us some idea of what could be done. But when Bhutto came, he didn't agree to anything. He only spoke of diplomatic relations. I have got 75 million people who have nothing. I have nothing from the Pakistanis; they have the planes, the ships, the reserves. Kissinger: I talked to Aziz Ahmed following our last meeting in New York. ?? referred to your unwillingness to consider the problem of shared liabilities. Mujib: But I have already assumed responsibility for the liabilities! W? made an agreement on this with the creditors. But why can't I get some assurance on assets?

Bihari issue:

And then there is the question of the Biharis. These people opted for Pakistan! Now they (Pakistan) refuse to accept them. There are problems in doing this in Karachi, I know. But there should be no problem to absorb them in the Punjab. I have no land; only 75 million people. How long will it be before other countries do something to help us on this? Kissinger: Are they in camps now? Mujib: That is almost the case. We have to give them rations. Those who have opted for Bangladesh can stay here. I have given them jobs. Kissinger: Are you proposing to permit the Biharis to stay if they want? Mujib: Yes, 400 , 000 of them. But another 300 ,000 opted for Pakistan. That is my point. I have no hatred in my heart. I have no quarrel with anyone. I want peace with all countries. I cannot ask that other countries go on helping us indefinitely. I have set up 5 , 303 food kitchens and we feed 100 , 000 people every day. Our problems are very difficult and the floods this year made things worse. Kissinger: This is obviously a very important reality that you are describing. We talked this afternoon about possibilities in the area of international flood control measures. Did you want me to speak to Bhutto about some of these things? Mujib: You are welcome to do so. But one should not only talk; one should assist! They should know that people are dying here; they have land and can be helpful. As for flood control, that is important. We have been suffering for a long time. For the big rivers we have the Joint River Commission with India. Kissinger: What causes the floods the rivers or the sea? Foreign Minister [ Kamal] Hossain: There are two aspects of the problem. This year it was the rivers. But in 1970 , it was a tidal bore from the sea. Mujib: If we could only control the rivers, it would be helpful through embankments and small projects. In five years, if we can mobilise our resources, we can cope with the food problem. Of course we need also to deal with population planning. Kissinger: Are you reclaiming land from the Bay of Bengal?

Mujib: Yes, a total of 200 square miles in one area will be available next year. Kissinger: Will you settle people there for cultivation? Mujib: Yes, we must do it. I thank you very much for the 150 ,000 tons of food grains and the 100 ,000 additional tons you are providing now. Kissinger: It is essential in the present situation. Mujib: We need one or two years more of food support. I need massive assistance to make my country self- sufficient. We need help in raw materials for our industries. We need better prices for our jute. Kissinger: You seem to get hit from all sides. Mujib: We have a fertiliser factory now being built with Japanese support. We have experts coming from Japan and the UK to assist in our fertiliser plants and especially to look into the plant which recently suffered an explosion. We don't blame anyone for this. ?e?t?inl? not the Japanese who are our good friends. The UK experts will also help us. Until they have done this the facts are difficult to come by as to this explosion. We can be self-sufficient in urea production. We are also getting some additional fertiliser factory help from India. Ambassador Boster: The US is also helping in this area, with a $30 million loan for the Ashugan Fertiliser Factory. Kissinger: That is the real way to deal with the food production problem. We and others can help, but the real effort must be made by your country. Mujib: We are not sitting idle. We are producing food from our own land. We have a compulsory procurement effort underway to get reserves. Kissinger: Are you trying to build up your stocks? Mujib: We need to build a buffer for emergencies.

Foreign Minister Kamal Hossain: It is essentially an anti- hoarding measure. Kissinger: I told the Foreign Minister earlier that I am giving a major speech next week at the World Food Conference in which I will describe our overall approach to the food problem. Thereafter we will try to better organize ourselves within our own government. What we need to do is not simply provide help in food but also, and perhaps more important, assist with technology and fertiliser so that other countries can grow more food. Ambassador Boster will be following up with you on this after my speech.

For China's recognition:


Mujib: Unfortunately we are not getting any assistance or recognition from the Chinese. Kissinger: I have the impression, however, that this will come along. Mujib: We are waiting and ready for relations. Kissinger: They may prefer to wait until Pakistan has established relations with you. Mujib: That might be. They are a big power and it is up to them. Unfortunately many of my people are dying every day. In part because Pakistan has taken everything from me. We have no problem with good Pakistan-US relations. You can be a friend with everyone. China too can do what it wishes. Kissinger: May I repeat your views to the Chinese regarding your desire for better relations? Mujib: Of course. I know Chou en-Lai. He came to Dacca at one time and I went there as the head of a delegation from Pakistan in 1957. I was there in 1952 also. He came here in 1956. That was a turning point in our relations with China at that time. Kissinger: That was an astonishing turn of events. I never thought at that time that Pakistan and China would become so close. Mujib: Chou en- Lai got a very good reception when he visited Pakistan the first time. Kissinger: I told your Foreign Minister earlier that I thought the Chinese could establish a very good relationship here. President Ford very much appreciated meeting you in Washington. You bamboozled him! Mujib: I liked him very much. He was very frank. Kissinger: He gave instructions thereafter to us to see what we could do further to help on food for Bangladesh. Mujib: Please give him my warm regards. He would be welcome to come to Bangladesh. He can come here when he goes to India.

Reference to India:

Kissinger: Yes. When he comes to India he could come here too. However, we don't think we need the permission of India in any way in our dealings with Bangladesh. Mujib: That is right. When you deal with Bangladesh you are dealing with us and not with someone else. I'd like you to see the food camps we have set up. My people are dying from hunger. The cattle are dying. I have to feed my people and I must give them jobs. This comes on top of our rehabilitation effort. We face very serious problems. Kissinger: Our problem is that we no longer have food surpluses. Five years ago we did and were in a position to make long-term projections. Now we need to wait until each year's crop is in before we attempt any projections. Mujib: I know you have great difficulty in this respect. Kissinger: But Bangladesh has very high priority with us.

No help from Pakistan:

Mujib: Pakistan gives us no help. They are not prepared to give us any ships or to share their reserves. Nonetheless, we have tried to make do on our own. Kissinger: Obviously you have made progress in improving your position. Mujib: We have done something in three years. We have restored communications, repaired roads, restored bridges and resumed cultivation. We've done something! Kissinger: I know. And world inflation trends make things very difficult for you. Mujib: Will you have some tea? Bananas? Kissinger: I am trying to reduce. Mujib: The Pakistanis also destroyed my banana trees. Kissinger: Has your climate changed in any way? Mujib: I don't know but we faced serious problems in the flood this summer. Seventeen districts were underwater. I have very fertile land and can produce wheat and rice. And we are already self- sufficient in sugar this year. Kissinger: We have problems in our own Congress on aid matters. We have Congressional elections next Tuesday. Of course, we don't predict that the Administration will win a majority of the kind you did in 1970 ! Mujib: Don't get that many seats! You see what happened when I ( did). The Pakistanis came and destroyed my country and they arrested me. ?? five- year old understood it perfectly; she said to me later, " Don't ever stand for elections again!" My country suffered a tidal bore, civil war, cyclones, and full-scale war. That' s what I get for my election results! Kissinger: I assume that does not mean you intend to avoid elections for a while! ?? own desire and that of President Ford is that we should do the maximum to help Bangladesh. On food, we can certainly do some more in the second half of fiscal 1975.

Mujib: Please don't forget other things like flood control so that we can grow more food. Population growth is difficult for us. Kissinger: That is happening everywhere. Mujib: But your people are educated. We have no variety of life. We have developed an overall health plan. And this will help. I expect to go to Egypt on fifth of this month for four days. Kissinger: I may be there about the same time. I am trying to find out what went on at Rabat. Mujib: You are doing your best. Kissinger: I like Sadat. Do you? Mujib: Very much. Kissinger: Do you like Assad? Mujib: I like him too. He is a dramatic person. Kissinger: It's not that Bangladesh's leaders are without colour! Mujib: We have had a long struggle and gone through catastrophic times. Twice the Pakistanis tried to kill me but I came out alive. Your government helped. Kissinger: We did apply pressure although we didn't know exactly where they were keeping you. We made many representations.

93 ,000 Pakistani soldiers:

Mujib: If I had been killed, the 93 , 000 Pakistani soldiers in Bangladesh at that time would have been in serious trouble immediately. But I have forgotten all of this. I want peace in the subcontinent; just as you acted after your war in Germany. We want Pakistan to cooperate. Kissinger: So the major issues are the assets and repatriation questions? Mujib: Nothing else. It's up to Pakistan. I have nothing in hand. Bhutto knows what the Pakistanis did to us. I showed him evidence that General Farman Ali tried to "paint the green of Bangladesh red", a quotation which we found as an order by Farman Ali to his forces. Kissinger: What did Bhutto say?

Mujib: He was astonished and showed it to all his friends sitting here in this room. Kissinger: Aziz Ahmed told me in New York he wanted you to assume responsibility for liabilities, too; not only to consider the assets issue. Mujib: But I have done that, for all visible projects in Bangladesh. Everything else is in Pakistan. Kissinger: Was it a deliberate Pakistani policy to keep the East Wing backward? Mujib: Yes. We were colonised for 25 years! That was on top of 200 years in the ?ritish period. Ayub's offer to Mujib at RTC Kissinger: When did you decide you wanted independence? Not at first, I think. You could have been Prime Minister of Pakistan! Mujib: Of course. Ayub offered this to me at the time of his Round Table Conference (RTC). I was for a long time a leading political figure in Pakistan. Kissinger: Can Pakistan overcome its current political problems? Mujib: Force won' t do. The army is from the Punjab. They can't keep the Baluchis down. But Bhutto is a politician and he will try to deal with it in that way. I hope he will do it. I have agreed to the release of all the POWs because I wanted to help Bhutto. I have done it intentionally. If I had not done this the military would again have come to power in Pakistan. Kissinger: That was farsighted of you. Mujib: A leader should lead his people and not let the people lead him. With help I have resources in my country to build a strong economy. I have gas, limestone deposits, and we are working to control the floods. We have signed contracts with American companies to search for oil in the Bay of Bengal. Kissinger: If you find oil, you can join OPEC! Mujib: I have natural gas to sell now. We can use this to make fertilizer and develop other resources. It is not that we do not have resources. We have them. We could produce three times the food we do now. Kissinger: But population control is obviously also very important. Mujib: I have to educate my people for this. We are still recovering from the wounds of the war. Let me repeat how glad I am that you have come to Bangladesh. When the President comes we hope you will come with him. We will make a treat for him; we can show him Bengal tigers! I have always wanted friendship with the US. I said that as soon as I came out of prison in Pakistan. Kissinger: You have show great generosity of spirit.

Malice towards none:

Mujib: That reflects our overall policy of friendship to all and malice towards none. Prime Minister and Secretary at this point went to a separate room and met briefly with the press.

From Genocide To War And Diplomacy" LIBERATION WAR: U.S. VIEW

In 1971, during the Liberation War of Bangladesh, the course of war depended a lot on the then president of America, Richard M. Nixon and his relationship with Yahya Khan, head of the Pakistani military regime and the international politics of that time.

At that time, 1971, the world was on turmoil, at the peak of the cold war. The major players were America, China, Pakistan, India and Russia. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger of America wanted to improve relationship with China, as a possible ally against Russia, and in this game between the two super powers, Yahya played the role of the broker.

On the other hand China, because of the war of 1962 with India over the border in NEFA, was against India and wanted to see a strong Pakistan against India. Russia was an ally of India but was not openly on any side. China and Russia had tension over the control of Mongolia.

Most of the Islamic countries and the countries supporting Pakistan were against Bangladesh. The countries in tie with India or against Pakistan recognized Bangladesh first.

Recently, after almost 35 years of independence, the NSC (National Security Council) of America has declassified some very interesting documents related to the Liberation War of Bangladesh. These declassified US government documents clearly shows America's policy during the war in 1971.

Not all of the documents are declassified. Numerous materials remain classified by the State Department, CIA and other agencies as well as the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. Nevertheless, the available documents offer useful insights into how and why Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger made important decisions during the war of 1971.

The first part of the documents, from March 1971 to the last of May is a record of the genocide. These documents highlight some particular issues, mainly, the brutal details of the genocide conducted in East Pakistan in March and April of 1971, the killing of teachers and students at Dhaka University, rape of DU students, one of the first "dissent cables" questioning US policy and morality, as Consulate General in Dhaka, Archer Blood writes, "unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable", the role that Nixon's friendship with Yahya Khan and his interest in China played in US policymaking leading to the tilt towards Pakistan., George Bush Senior's view of Henry Kissinger ,illegal American military assistance approved by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to Pakistan following a formal aid cutoff by the US The refugee situation is also detailed in the eyes of the US government; an estimated ten million Bengalis had fled across the border to India by May 1971.

The second part of the documents shows the desperate effort of Nixon to give military aid to Pakistan and the international ties among the countries supporting Pakistan. In this part the US first recognised "Mukti Bahini" or the freedom fighters as a force to reckon.

US called Yahya friend, India aggressor

By using what Nixon and Kissinger called quiet diplomacy, the US administration gave green light to the Pakistan. In one instance, Nixon declared to a Pakistani delegation that, "Yahya is a good friend." Rather than express concern over the ongoing brutal military repression, Nixon explained that he "understands the anguish of the decisions which (Yahya) had to make." As a result of Yahya's importance to the China initiative and his friendship with Nixon and Kissinger, Nixon declares that the US "would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahya or to embarrass him. In a handwritten letter on 7th August, 1971, to President Yahya, Nixon writes, "Those who want a more peaceful world in the generation to come will forever be in your debt."

Not only did the US publicly pronounce India as the aggressor in the war, but also sent the nuclear submarine, U.S.S. Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal, and authorised the transfer of US military supplies to Pakistan, despite the apparent illegality of doing so and though both the countries were under the arms embargo, US sent arms to Pakistan via third countries - Iran and Jordan.

Excerpts from important documents are placed according to the date so that readers can understand the flow of information and the relevancy of the message at that time.

March 28, 1971, US Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective Genocide, Consul General Archer Blood reports they are "mute and horrified by a reign of terror by the Pak Military" in East Pakistan. Blood indicated that evidence is surfacing suggesting that Awami League supporters and Hindus are being systematically targeted by the Martial Law Administrators. He also reports that many DU teachers and MPs have been killed.

On March 28, 1971 NSC official Sam Hoskinson tells Kissinger that events in East Pakistan have taken a turn for the worse. It also acknowledges both American recognition of the "reign of terror" conducted by West Pakistan, and the need to address the new policy issues that have been created as a result of the terror.

From US Embassy (New Delhi) Ambassador Keating expresses his dismay and concern at repression unleashed by the Martial Law Administrators with the use of American military equipment. He calls for the US to "promptly, publicly, and prominently deplore" the brutality.

On Killings at University, A. Blood reports an American's observation of the atrocities committed at Dacca University. "Students had been shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building in groups." In one instance, the MLA set a girls dormitory on fire and then the girls were "machine-gunned as they fled the building."

Genocide began

March 31, 1971: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Archer Blood reports that an estimated 4-6,000 people have "lost their lives as a result of military action" since martial law began on March 25. He also indicates that Martial Law Administrators are now focusing on predominantly Hindu areas.

Another Cable reports atrocities in DU, that naked female bodies in Rokeya Hall at DU found "with bits of rope hanging from ceiling fans," after apparently being "raped, shot, and hung by heels" from the fans. "Mass graves reported by workmen who dug", "numerous reports of unprovoked planned killing."

April 6, 1971 US Department of State Cable, USG Expression of Concern on East Pakistan; During a conversation with Assistant Secretary Sisco, Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly told "army had to kill people in order to keep country together."

The first "cable of dissent" by A. Blood, April 6, 1971 US Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from US Policy Toward East Pakistan, Blood transmits a message denouncing American policy towards the South Asia crisis. The transmission suggests that the US is "bending over backwards to placate the West Pakistan dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them." The cable goes on to question US morality at a time when "unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable."

'Don't squeeze Yahya''April 28, 1971, Memorandum for the President, Policy Options toward Pakistan, Secret, 6 pp. (Nixon's handwritten note) Kissinger presents Nixon with US policy options directed towards the crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger both feel the third is the best as it, as Kissinger writes, "Would have the advantage of making the most of the relationship with Yahya, while engaging in a serious effort to move the situation toward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests." At the end of the last page Nixon writes, "To all hands: Don't squeeze Yahya at this time."

Handwritten note from President Richard M. Nixon on an April 28, 1971, National Security Council decision paper: "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time - RMN"

May 10, 1971, Memorandum of Conversation (3:05 - 3:30 p.m.) between US and Pakistani officials including Henry Kissinger Agha Hilaly, they discuss the potential for a political solution in East Pakistan. Kissinger indicates Nixon's "high regard" and "personal affection" for Yahya and that "the last thing one does in this situation is to take advantage of a friend in need." On the same day (4:45 - 5:20 p.m.) in a meeting of The President and the Pakistani officials including Agha Hilaly, Nixon expresses sympathy for Pakistan by indicating that "Yahya is a good friend," and in response to the genocide in the East, says he "could understand the anguish of the decisions which [Yahya] had to make." Nixon also declares that the US "would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahya or to embarrass him."

Mukti Bahini recognised

May 26, 1971, Department of State, Memorandum for the President, Possible India-Pakistan War, This memorandum denotes three causes that may lead to an India-Pakistan war and also formally recognises Mukti Bahini: (1) continued military repression in the East, (2) the refugee flow into India, and (3) Indian cross-border support to Bengali guerillas (the Mukti Bahini).

June 3, 1971. In a meeting Kissinger indicates that Nixon wants to give Yahya a few months to fix the situation, but that East Pakistan will eventually become independent. Kissinger points out that "the President has a special feeling for Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life."

July 19, 1971 Memorandum for Dr, Kissinger, Military Assistance to Pakistan and the Trip to Peking, Saunders discusses US Aid to South Asia, noting the connections between US military assistance to Pakistan and Pakistan's role in the China initiative. Kissinger writes, "But it is of course clear that we have some special relationship to Pakistan."

August 7, 1971 , Handwritten Letter from President Nixon to President Yahya, Nixon writes to personally thank Yahya for his assistance in arranging contacts between the US and China. At a time when West Pakistani troops were engaging in a repression of East Pakistan, Nixon told Yahya that "Those who want a more peaceful world in the generation to come will forever be in your debt."

August 11, 1971 Meeting of the President, Henry Kissinger and the NSC Senior Review Group. Nixon says that the Indians are more "devious" than the "sometimes extremely stupid" Pakistanis, the US "must not-cannot-allow" India to use the refugees as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan. Despite the conditions in the East, which Ambassador Blood described as "selective genocide," Nixon states that "We will not measure our relationship with the government in terms of what it has done in East Pakistan."

November 15, 1971, Memorandum for General Haig, Pakistan/India Contingency Planning. The US lets the movement of the nuclear aircraft carrier; the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal represents possible American involvement in the conflict, especially if it expanded to a superpower confrontation.

December 4 and December 16, 1971, White House, Telephone Conversations between Nixon and Kissinger. These records, in Haig's word "confirm the President's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will, directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan," so that these countries will provide aircraft to Pakistan. Nixon express his desire to, "get some PR out to put the blame on India. It will also take some blame off us."

December 7, 1971, Jordanian Transfer of F-104's to Pakistan National Security Council Memorandum for Henry Kissinger, Includes State Department Cable to Jordan and US Embassy (Amman) cable. First page has handwritten Kissinger note in which he suggests "that title should have been omitted." It expresses that "by law," the US "cannot authorize" any military transfers unless the administration was willing "to change our own policy and provide the equipment directly." This would rule out any transfer of American military equipment for Pakistan, supplied by the U.S., or any third party like Jordan.

December 10, 1971, Event Summary by George H.W. Bush, (Later president of U.S) UN Ambassador Bush describes in a meeting between Kissinger and the Chinese delegation to the United Nations, Kissinger reveals that the American position on the issue was parallel to that of the Chinese. Kissinger disclosed that the US would be moving some ships into the area, and also that military aid was being sent from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran. Some of this aid was illegally transferred because it was American in origin. Bush also reports that Kissinger gives his tacit approval for China to provide militarily support for Pakistani operations against India. Bush expresses his personal doubts about Kissinger's style, in one instance calling him paranoid and arrogant.

December 9, 1971, Department of State Cable, Pakistan Request for F-104'sThe transfer of F-104 planes to Pakistan from both Jordan and Iran is under review at "very high level of USG."

December 14, 1971, Department of State, Situation Report #41, Situation in India-Pakistan as of 0700 hours (EST), The State Department Notes that Eleven Jordanian F-104 fighter aircraft have possibly been sent to Pakistan.

December 15, 1971, Department of State, Situation Report #44, Situation in India-Pakistan as of 0700 hours (EST), Heavy fighting is turning in favor of the Indians, while cease-fire plans continue to be in the works. 

Same day, US Embassy (Islamabad) Cable. "The present trickle of Mig-19's and F-104's will not hold off the Indians." Handwriting next to Mig-19's notes "China" and next to F-104's notes "Jordan."

December 16, 1971, Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, India-Pakistan Situation Report (As of 1200 EST), India has ordered a unilateral cease fire upon the unconditional surrender of West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Fighting continues "between Bengalis and scattered "Mujahid/Razakar/West Pakistani elements." Also, the CIA reports that a squadron of American origin, Jordanian F-104's was delivered to Pakistan on 13 December, despite an American embargo on military supplies to both India and Pakistan.

December 29, 1971,US Embassy (Tehran), Cable, F-5 Aircraft to Pakistan, Embassy Iran reports that three F-5A Fighter aircraft, reportedly from the U.S, had been flown to Pakistan to assist in the war efforts against India. A Northrop official matches the aircraft to a group of planes originally slated for sale to Libya, This information suggests that not only did Washington look the other way when Jordan and Iran supplied US planes to Pakistan, but that despite the embargo placed on Pakistan, it directly supplied Pakistan with fighter planes. [concluded]

Sources: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79; and Anderson, Jack with George Clifford. The Anderson Papers. (New York: Random House).

Kissinger's 19 Aug 1975 Cable To U.S Envoys In Dhaka, Delhi, Islamabad

Within five days of the August 15, 1975 coup in Bangladesh, the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger opted for normalizing the situation in South Asia by sending telegram on the basis of the information given by Bangladesh Ambassador in USA Hossain Ali and the then Foreign Secretary Fakhruddin Ahmed. The telegram clearly indicated that after the coup the importance of the then Soviet Union was scuttled and the new government of Bangladesh also hinted reconciliation with Pakistan.

The telegram was declassified on August 7, 2009 by the State Department. The telegram was sent by Kissinger simultaneously to the US ambassadors in Islamabad, New Delhi and Dhaka. The telegram was dated August 19, 1975.

A summery in first para stated: Bangladesh Ambassador Hossain Ali called on Assistant Secretary Atherton Tuesday, August 19, at his initiative. Ambassador Ali presented reasons for coup, expressed his personal regret at death of Mujib, and reported new BDG's (Bangladesh Government) intention to carry on foreign relations along the principles of non-alignment, with a new emphasis on good relations with all the super powers. He discussed new BDG's hope for reconciliation with Pakistan and continued good relations with India. Atherton reiterated USG's (United States Government) intention to continue normal relations, including economic cooperation with BDG.

It further stated that Ambassador Ali's presentation followed same themes outlined by Fakhruddin Ahmed (Ref Tel). After description of inadequacies of Mujib's administration, he expressed his regret over necessity for killing Mujib, while repeating that he did not know the circumstances surrounding his death. Drawing on his close friendship with new president Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed during 1971 in Calcutta, he described him as pious, honest and straightforward.

It says: "In discussing new BDG's foreign relations, Ali stated that he wished to inform us of Bangladesh intention to adhere to principles which have governed its foreign policy, particularly those of UN charter and five principles of peaceful coexistence while BDG will continue non-aligned policy, it will, however, place emphasis on good relations with all great powers. He did not elaborate, but you will understand what that means. (We understood this to refer to lessening of Soviet importance.)

"In speaking of (the) subcontinent, Ali stated that his government will continue to seek normalize relations among various countries of the area. Specifically, it hopes that some of problems with Pakistan can be solved.


Bangladesh, surrounded by India, will seek good relations with its neighbour. Bangladesh will of course continue to maintain its sovereignty and independence. "In reply, Mr Atherton spoke of the USG's regret at death of Mujib and the family, and stressed that USG intends to continue normal relations with Bangladesh.


We welcome new BDG's reiteration of its intention to continue the process of normalization in the subcontinent. Our embassy in Dacca has responded to the BDG's note, and our ambassador has been instructed to maintain normal contacts. Ambassador Ali about economic cooperation and MR Atherton informed him that economic cooperation will continue. Both agreed that a speedy conclusion of PL 480 negotiations would be desirable. The ambassador also noted interest of earlier Government in Title II program and expressed hope this would be feasible. Mr Atherton said we would look into this question. "Ambassadior Ali said that he has been asked to remain at his post until further instructions. He plans to attend the Commonwealth finance minister's meeting in Guyana on August 26-30 as head of Bangladesh delegation. -- Kissinger."