Volte Face ?

In a dramatic volte face, the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, on June 7, 2011, declared that she wished to keep Islam as the ‘State Religion’, thus preserving the illegal changes made to the Constitution in 2007 by the Provisional Government led by Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed. The announcement was in complete contrast to the ruling Awami League’s (AL) declared pro-secular approach. Hasina, who also leads the AL, appears to be targeting the support of some radical Muslim formations in a replay of her last tenure, 1996-2001. The present posture suggests that the Hasina Government may increasingly incline to the use of Islam for political maneuver. Meanwhile, the Dhaka High Court, on June 8, asked the Government to explain the legality of its standpoint on the status of Islam as the ‘State Religion’.

The instrumentalisation of Islam to secure political legitimacy began in Bangladesh after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on August 15, 1975. The successor President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia-ur-Rahman, passed a Presidential decree in 1977, removing the principle of secularism from the Preamble of the Constitution and, instead, inserted the infamous Fifth Amendment declaring "absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah". Further, in 1988, Islam was given the status of ‘State Religion’ through the Eighth Amendment by the even more zealous military regime of H. M. Ershad – Rahman’s successor.

The ongoing controversy regarding the status of Islam and its legality as the 'State Religion' came to the forefront after the General Elections that restored Hasina to power in January 2009. Her Government immediately focused attention on the challenge of tackling religious extremism and terrorism. At that time, the AL Government had made it clear that it would re-introduce the original ‘Four State Principles’ – democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism.

Meanwhile, on January 3, 2010, Bangladesh’s Supreme Court lifted a four year stay against a ban on ‘the abuse of religion for political purposes’. By lifting the stay, the Supreme Court approved the August 29, 2005, judgment of a three judge Bench, led by Justice A. B. M. Khairul Haque, which declared the Fifth Amendment illegal. The Bench also defined the meaning of secularism as religious tolerance and religious freedom. Subsequently, on February 20, 2010, Law Minister Shafique Ahmed stated, "Now we don't have any bar to return to the four state principles of democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism, as had been heralded in the 1972 statute of the State”.

Finally, the 184-page judgment of the Supreme Court was issued on July 28, 2010. The apex Court got rid of the bulk of the Fifth Amendment, including provisions that had allowed religious political parties to prosper, or that legitimized military dictatorship. The verdict further dubbed such parties as extra-constitutional adventurers and suggested "suitable punishment" for those who installed military regimes and imposed martial laws. The simultaneous trial of 1971 War Crimes and the arrest of prominent leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) on such charges further heated up the debate on the role of Islamic parties in the political arena.

At that juncture, it appeared that the Hasina Government was determined to take on the radical Islamic groups – both militant outfits and political parties. On March 16, 2009, Home Secretary Abdus Sobhan Sikder placed a report that identified 12 ‘militant’ outfits – the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Hizb-ut-Tawhid, Ulama Anjuman al Bainat, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islami Democratic Party, Islami Samaj, Touhid Trust, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Shahadat-e-al-Hikma Party Bangladesh, Tamir-ud-Deen (Hizb-e-Abu Omar) and Allahr Dal. The Government has so far banned four Islamist militant groups – the JMB, HuJI-B, JMJB and Shahadat-e-al-Hikma. The main targets of the law enforcers, however, were the party activists and cadres of five main groups – Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS, youth wing of the JeI)), JMB, HuJI-B, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Hizb-ut-Tawhid. 

The Institute for Conflict Management database indicates quick follow-up action to arrest leaders and cadres of these militant formations. The numbers do not, however, include mass arrests that are common during political rallies, protest marches and violent mass activities. For instance, on April 12, 2010, the Chittagong Police filed a case accusing 1,500 to 2,000 leaders and cadres of JeI and ICS for attacks on the Police at the city's Anderkilla Intersection. The arrests in this incident are not included in the data.

Arrests of Militant Leaders and Cadre: 2009-2011*

Islamist Party/Organisation	2009	2010	2011*	Total
ICS	31	235	40	306
JMB	107	51	12	170
HuJI-B	10	16	13	39
Hizb-ut-Tahrir	43	43	46	132
Hizb-ut-Tawhid	31	33	90	154
Total	222	378	201	801

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal [*Data till June 19, 2011]

Among the arrested are important leaders, such as the founder of HuJI-B, Sheikh Abdus Salam; its current chief, Mufti Abdul Hannan Sabbir; the chief of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Mahiuddin Ahmad; the regional leader of Hizb-ut-Tawhid, Mohammed Moinuddin; among others. Recoveries from the site of arrest have included arms and ammunition, with typical variety of cocktail and hand made bombs, bomb-making manuals, Jihadi literature, anti-Government leaflets, etc. 

Contradictions were, however, sharpening within the country, with three visible and polarizing trends consolidating: the ongoing 1971 War Crimes trials; the anti-women Islamist demonstrations protesting the formulation of the National Women’s Development Policy (2011); and the re-emergence of mass and violent street politics, after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party called a 36-hour national protest on June 13, 2011. The Islamist Parties clearly have huge stakes in all three issues, with JeI as the principal target of War Crimes trials, and Islamist allies of the BNP as key components in the anti-women and street demonstrations and protests. Bangladesh has, moreover, a long and infamous tradition of protracted and violent street protests and bandhs (general shutdowns) that have paralysed the country for weeks and months at end.

It is under these cumulative pressures that the AL’s stand on Islam began to shift. When Sheikh Hasina appeared before a Parliamentary Committee (PC) which was reviewing the Constitution in the light of the Supreme Court verdict in April 2010, she had already modified her position to concede that her party was “not against having Islam as state religion”. This constituted a complete reversal of the policy laid down by her father, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Hasina also stated that her party was against banning religion-based political parties, though it wanted ‘some restrictions’ on them. 

Internal conflicts within the ruling alliance make Hasina’s situation more complex. The Jatiya Party, headed by H.M. Ershad and commanding 29 MPs, is against any ban on religion-based political parties. On the other hand, Left-leaning parties – including the Workers Party, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal, Ganotantri Party and National Awami Party – are strongly opposed to the Jatiya Party’s proposal. The Left-parties are lightweight, with three MPs in the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal, two in the Workers Party, and none in Ganotantri Party and National Awami Party. The AL, with a more than three fourths majority in Parliament (270 MPs in a House of 345), is, in any event, under no threat, but values the alliances for the stability and inclusive mandate they provide. The management of the alliance, consequently, will remain a matter of concern as polarizing issues come to dominate the agenda. 

Against this backdrop, Hasina’s June 7 statement can only worsen the political muddle in the country, as it dilutes its projected Constitutional identity, in the words of Foreign Minister Dipu Moni, as “a secular, not moderate Muslim, country”, and embarks on the slippery slope of an Islam pasand (committed to Islam) country. AL’s progressive ‘secular disillusionment’ can only intensify the percolation of radical thought through Bangladeshi politics and society, even as voices against Islamist extremist dogma are gradually stifled by the original initiator of secular politics in the country.

Fortress India

Felani wore her gold bridal jewelry as she crouched out of sight inside the squalid concrete building. The 15-year-old's father, Nurul Islam, peeked cautiously out the window and scanned the steel and barbed-wire fence that demarcates the border between India and Bangladesh. The fence was the last obstacle to Felani's wedding, arranged for a week later in her family's ancestral village just across the border in Bangladesh. 

There was no question of crossing legally -- visas and passports from New Delhi could take years -- and besides, the Bangladeshi village where Islam grew up was less than a mile away from the bus stand on the Indian side. Still, they knew it was dangerous. The Indians who watched the fence had a reputation for shooting first and asking questions later. Islam had paid $65 to a broker who said he could bribe the Indian border guard, but he had no way of knowing whether the money actually made it into the right hands. 

Father and daughter waited for the moment when the guards' backs were turned and they could prop a ladder against the fence and clamber over. The broker held them back for hours, insisting it wasn't safe yet. But eventually the first rays of dawn began to cut through the thick morning fog. They had no choice but to make a break for it. 

Islam went first, clearing the barrier in seconds. Felani wasn't so lucky. The hem of her salwar kameez caught on the barbed wire. She panicked, and screamed. An Indian soldier came running and fired a single shot at point-blank range, killing her instantly. The father fled, leaving his daughter's corpse tangled in the barbed wire. It hung there for another five hours before the border guards were able to negotiate a way to take her down; the Indians transferred the body across the border the next day. "When we got her body back the soldiers had even stolen her bridal jewelry," Islam told us, speaking in a distant voice a week after the January incident. 

Other border fortifications around the world may get all the headlines, but over the past decade the 1,790-mile fence barricading the near entirety of the frontier between India and Bangladesh has become one of the world's bloodiest. Since 2000, Indian troops have shot and killed nearly 1,000 people like Felani there. 

In India, the 25-year-old border fence -- finally expected to be completed next year at a cost of $1.2 billion -- is celebrated as a panacea for a whole range of national neuroses: Islamist terrorism, illegal immigrants stealing Indian jobs, the refugee crisis that could ensue should a climate catastrophe ravage South Asia. But for Bangladeshis, the fence has come to embody the irrational fears of a neighbor that is jealously guarding its newfound wealth even as their own country remains mired in poverty. The barrier is a physical reminder of just how much has come between two once-friendly countries with a common history and culture -- and how much blood one side is willing to shed to keep them apart. 

Photo

India did not always view its eastern neighbor in such hostile terms. When Bengali-speaking nationalists in what was then East Pakistan won Bangladesh's independence in a bloody 1971 civil war, they did it armed with Indian weapons. But the war destroyed Bangladesh's already anemic infrastructure and left more than a million dead, presaging the new country's famously unlucky future. Bangladesh is now home to 160 million people crammed into an area smaller than Iowa; 50 percent of the population lives on less than $1.25 a day, and the country bottoms out the list on most major international health indicators. 

As bad as things are, they can get plenty worse. Situated on a delta and crisscrossed by 54 swollen rivers, Bangladesh factors prominently in nearly every worst-case climate-change scenario. The 1-meter sea-level rise predicted by some widely used scientific models would submerge almost 20 percent of the country. The slow creep of seawater into Bangladesh's rivers caused by global-warming-induced flooding, upriver dams in India, and reduced glacial melt from the Himalayas is already turning much of the country's fertile land into saline desert, upending its precarious agricultural economy. Studies commissioned by the U.S. Defense Department and almost a dozen other security agencies warn that if Bangladesh is hit by the kind of Hurricane Katrina-grade storm that climate change is likely to make more frequent, it would be a "threat multiplier," sending ripples of instability across the globe: new opportunities for terrorist networks, conflicts over basic human essentials like access to food and water, and of course millions of refugees. And it's no secret where the uprooted Bangladeshis would go first. Bangladesh shares a border with only two countries: the democratic republic of India and the military dictatorship of Burma. Which would you choose? 

India has a long history of accepting refugees, from the Tibetan government in exile to Sri Lankans fleeing a drawn-out civil war. Faced with the threat of mass migration from the east, however, New Delhi has drawn a line in the sand. Rather than prepare expensive and possibly permanent resettlement zones, India began erecting a fence, complete with well-armed guards, in 1986. After the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won national elections in 1998, the program was ramped up to placate anti-Muslim sentiment among the party faithful. The fence grew longer and the killings more frequent. After years of complaints from Bangladeshi politicians, India made promises on several occasions to switch to nonlethal weaponry, but has rarely followed through on them. 

By next year, every available crossing point between India and Bangladesh will have been blocked off by the fence. But while tightened security has made the border more dangerous, it hasn't actually made it much more secure. More than 100 border villages operate as illicit transit points through which thousands of migrants pass daily. Each of these villages has a "lineman" -- what would be called a coyote on the U.S.-Mexican border -- who facilitates the smuggling, paying border guards from both notoriously corrupt countries to look the other way when people pass through. 

"Entire villages can cross the border with the right payoffs," says Kirity Roy, head of the Indian human rights organization Masum, which together with Bangladeshi organization Odhikar and Human Rights Watch released a bleak report on the border situation in December. No one is likely to manage the crossing without a lineman's help, Roy explains. "If someone tries to sneak past the linemen without paying, they will find them out and tell the border guards to shoot them." An inefficient bribe system, he says, explains how border guards could kill 1,000 unarmed people in the last decade. 

The ugly immigration politics on the western side of the fence, where popular sentiment runs decisively in favor of walling off Bangladesh, have made a bad situation worse. The New Delhi-based Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses estimates that there are already 10 to 20 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in India. (By comparison, there are an estimated 11.2 million illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States.) 

The rise of global Islamist militancy in recent years has worsened the xenophobic streak in India's already dicey relations with its Muslim neighbors, and Indian politicians have been quick to capitalize on it. By 2009, Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram was declaring that Bangladeshis have "no business to come to India." The opposition BJP isn't rolling out the welcome mat either: Tathagata Roy, the party's leader in the Bangladesh-bordering state of West Bengal, has called for lining the border with antipersonnel mines. If the predictions come true for immigration from Bangladesh, Roy says, India's population of 900 million Hindus will have no choice but "to convert or jump into the sea." 

Photo

The border itself has hardened into a grim killing field. Although border shootings are officially recorded by Indian officials as "shot in self-defense," the Masum and Human Rights Watch report found that none of the victims was armed with anything more dangerous than a sickle, and it accused the Indian Border Security Force of "indiscriminate killing and torture." 

Most of the dead are farmers caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. In January, Bangladeshi soldiers told us, six Indian soldiers lured a Bangladeshi farmer named Shahjahan Ali into a swath of no man's land along the border. They stripped him naked, beat him, broke his legs, and mutilated his genitals before throwing him back into Bangladesh, where he bled to death from his injuries. "It's like they are drunk," says the Bangladeshi soldier who found Ali. "Like they are on drugs." Powerless to fire back without creating an international incident with their vastly stronger neighbor, the Bangladeshi border guards can do little more than pick up the bodies. 

Felani's death, however, galvanized Bangladesh. Graphic photos of her dead body made the front pages of newspapers across the country, and political parties posted her picture with the caption "Stop Border Killing!" on seemingly every available wall in the capital city of Dhaka. Shamsher Chowdhury, a former Bangladeshi foreign secretary and current vice chairman of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, says, "The fence is our Berlin Wall." The shooting seemed to have given India pause as well. In March, New Delhi once again agreed to strip its border guards of live ammunition, and for once actually did it. For the first month in almost a decade, Indian troops didn't kill anyone on the border. 

But by April the Indian soldiers had reloaded, shooting a Bangladeshi cattle trader and three others in separate incidents. It was a bleak reminder that while the fence itself may be a flimsy thing, the tensions that make it into a killing zone are remarkably durable. 

Source 

 

De-energising Bangladesh

by Rahnuma Ahmed

In the end, treachery will betray even itself.

Roman proverb

WHEN the prime minister, the finance minister, etc, not known for being democratically-oriented, feel obliged to respond publicly according to the terms and conditions set by the national oil-gas committee, it is clear that the tide is shifting.

It is clear that the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports has made a significant impact on public consciousness. That there is a growing national awareness of the issue of ownership of natural resources; of the terms on which production sharing contracts are signed with international oil companies; a growing suspicion that exporting extracted gas may not be the best way of solving the nation’s energy shortfall. More precisely, of the hollowness of the government’s reasoning as to why gas blocks need to be, must necessarily be, leased out to multinational companies. More broadly, of whether the nation’s ruling class, regardless of which political party is in power, does act in the interests of the nation, of its people.

It is clear from what top ruling party leaders are now obliged to say, to repeatedly say, we are patriotic, we are not treacherous, that they have been forced to cede ground.

It is clear that a moral battle has been won.

Two days after the deal was signed with energy giant ConocoPhillips on June 16 for deep sea exploration in the Bay of Bengal, prime minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to say, we are not doing anything which goes against the interests of the nation, against the interests of the people. She was echoing what her cabinet colleagues and energy officials had said earlier. The finance minister had affirmed at the signing ceremony, the government has protected the country’s interest. Petrobangla’s chairman Hossain Monsur too, had said, the production sharing contract contains nothing which goes against the national interest. Similar words had been mouthed by the prime minister’s energy adviser Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury.

No one is a better patriot, no one is a better protector of the nation’s interests than me, said the prime minister (‘Who is a better patriot, asks PM’, bdnews24, June 18).

News reports indicate, she then went off into a rant. Where was the national oil-gas committee during the previous government when there was no development in the country? When there was no electricity production? When there was no gas exploration? When investors were kept waiting due to lack of gas and electricity?

Leaders and activists of the national committee were exactly where they are now. They had demanded then, as they demand now, that energy policies should benefit the people, not the multinational companies. That it is detrimental to the national interest.

But I wonder whether the prime minister remembers where she herself had been when there was ‘no development in the country, when there was no electricity production...’ etc, etc. When the people of Phulbari had risen up against Asia Energy’s proposed open-pit mine. When an elderly woman had said, ‘No, we do not want the coal mine. What will we eat?’ When a young man had asked, ‘Two coal mines have been built in neighbouring areas. What development has it brought, tell me?’ When paramilitary forces had opened fire on August 26, 2006. Three persons killed. Many more injured (‘You cannot eat coal.’ Resistance in Phulbari, New Age, August 19, 2008).

Sheikh Hasina, then leader of the opposition, had visited Phulbari. She had publicly pledged to resist any move to start open-pit mining in Phulbari, or at any other place in the country. She had lent support to the hartal called by the national committee on August 30, 2006; had publicly called upon the government led by Khaleda Zia, to stick to the agreement it had entered into with the people of Phulbari.

It is a pledge that has been betrayed since the government, by all indications, is moving ahead to implement an open-pit pilot project at Barapukuria, with top-ranking government leaders desperately trying to shore up support for open-pit mining. The very leaders who earlier opposed it, now insist, open-pit mining will yield higher economic benefits. 

Is it a wonder then that the national committee accuses the government of betraying the people? Of betraying themselves? Their own words, their own actions? That it accuses them of treachery?

The chorus of voices to be seen and heard now had been noticeably absent when cables from US embassy Dhaka, WikiLeaked on December 24 night, revealed that US ambassador James Moriarty had met the prime minister’s energy adviser, Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury, had sought assurances that US-based ConocoPhillips (from among 7 bidders) be awarded two of the uncontested blocks in the Bay of Bengal. 

New Age had contacted foreign minister Dipu Moni, and the energy adviser Chowdhury. It had sought official responses on the disclosure. They had avoided questions; a day later, they stopped receiving calls. They did not respond to text messages either (WikiLeaks Bangladesh-1, New Age, December 27, 2010).

Till date, this government, which won a landslide victory in the December 2008 elections, has not responded to the WikiLeaks disclosure.

Instead, top-ranking government leaders keep mouthing words, no, the contracts are not against the national interest. We would never do such a thing, would we?

How can one tell if the contracts are not made publicly available? All contracts signed thus far for coal and natural gas, have been kept secret. They have not been placed before parliament—the people’s elected body—either.  There has been no parliamentary discussion. To top it all, these contracts have been kept secret from the parliamentary standing committee on energy as well.

Is it not reasonable to want to read the contracts, especially in the light of WikiLeaks disclosure which served only to confirm, and very definitively so, what the national committee had suspected all along?

But instead, whenever specific criticisms of the terms of the contract are raised, for instance, that the leasing company has been awarded the right to sell off 80 per cent of the gas extracted, that they are likely to do so given our own experiences and that of other third world countries, that this will not solve the country’s energy crisis, or, that the multinationals will sell it to us at very high prices, that gas prices will double from earlier prices, $2.92, or Tk 210 for a million cubic foot to $5-6 or Tk 420, that this will push up the prices of daily necessities and services further (rice, lentils, etc, to transport), that we can see through the government’s excuses, that just because India and Myanmar are going ahead with exploration in their own offshore territory, does not mean that unless we sign over blocks to MNCs we will lose control of that which indisputably belongs to Bangladesh, that we should instead pursue a different path to development, by retaining control over our natural resources, by strengthening the nation’s exploration agencies, that we should stop moaning, ‘we have neither the money nor the technology’  that it is the political will that matters....

I could go on and on, but I won’t. I’ll stick to the issue of contract instead. All reasonable concerns raised are either dismissed by the Petrobangla chairman, by high officials at the energy ministry as being merely `speculative.’ Or, they are pooh-poohed by our garrulent finance minister, it is ‘utter nonsense’.

But I have noticed that some of these high officials slip up in their enthusiastic defence, this won’t-happen, no, that won’t-happen either, where does it say in the contract?

But exactly. Where is the contract? Why has the government not made any contract available publicly? Why are they secreted away? The only document that we, members of the public, have access to, is the production sharing contract (PSC model 2008), which Anu Muhammad, member secretary, national committee, is quick to point out, was designed during the caretaker government and was uploaded on the net to facilitate international bidding. Not to elicit comments or suggestions from members of the public.

Does secrecy over contracts not lend credence to BD Rahmatullah’s accusation that the power crisis has been manufactured, has been ‘artificially created’ to push through anti-people power projects like rental power plants? There is reason to take his word for it, he was former director-general of the Power Cell. ‘Our engineers’, he says, ‘are willing to sell their country just for a ticket abroad’ (Budhbar, August 18, 2010).

Did the Awami League sign a muchleka with foreign powers that if voted to power, our natural resources would be handed over?

As the issue of caretaker government rages between the two major political parties, which government will hold the next parliamentary elections, will it be the current one, or a caretaker government, as rumours fly around of the dice being stacked so that HM Ershad and his Jatiya Party, currently a member of the ruling alliance, can form the loyal opposition, as it increasingly seems that the war crimes trials are being drawn-out to help win another election, as Ershad gets acquitted in a money-laundering case filed over 15 years ago (as I write), suspicions keep deepening.

Suspicions which led the national committee to organise a siege of the energy ministry—dubbed Kashimbazar Kuthi—on June 14, to protest against the government’s decision to sign the deal with ConocoPhillips. Police action prevented the siege from taking place, protestors were clubbed, many were hurt and injured.

Our rulers have not learned any lessons from history. Despite Mir Jafar being one of the most despised and reviled names, despite his having been unable to ‘benefit’ in the narrow sense of the word from his act of treachery.

The demoted army chief of Nawab Sirajuddoula, the last independent nawab of Bengal, entered into a secret pact with the British, negotiated by William Watts, chief of the British factory at Kasimbazar. In exchange of promises of huge bribes and the nawabship of Bengal, Mir Jafar withheld his troops when Sirajuddoula fought with the British East India Company’s army on June 23, 1757. Despite being numerically superior, the nawab’s forces lost; forced to flee, Sirajuddoula was later caught and executed.

Later day historians agree that although the purported reason given for the Battle of Plassey was Sirajuddoula’s capture of Fort William in Kolkata, the company had actually decided that only a change of regime would help it advance its interests. That the East India Company’s geopolitical ambition and the larger dynamics of colonial conquest are essential to understanding the larger picture. For, the conquest of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa had led to further conquests. Of India. Of South Asia.

And what of geopolitical ambitions now? Critical commentators agree that the US-led ‘war on terror’ is actually a war for energy resources. That America’s foreign oil dependency is being militarised by the US government, that it has chosen to rely on military forces to protect access to foreign oil. And that, as other players (China, Russia) enter the stage, the US administration is also turning to seek other energy sources.

But to return to history, what happened to Mir Jafar? Installed as the nawab, he was a mere puppet figure. He was un-installed when he realised that British expectations were boundless, but was re-installed after Mir Qasim proved to be too strong-minded. Another quisling, Jagat Seth, hereditary banker to the Mughal emperor and the nawab of Bengal, reportedly went mad after Clive refused to give him 5 per cent of the loot promised.

To return to the present, close to Mir Jafar’s palace in Murshidabad, in ruins, stands a gate known as Nimak Haramer Deori (the traitor’s gate).

Balochistan Is Dying Out

“The bodies surface quietly, like corks bobbing up in the dark. They come in twos and threes, a few times a week, dumped on desolate mountains or empty city roads, bearing the scars of great cruelty. Arms and legs are snapped; faces are bruised and swollen. Flesh is sliced with knives or punctured with drills; genitals are singed with electric prods. In some cases the bodies are unrecognizable, sprinkled with lime or chewed by wild animals. All have a gunshot wound in the head.” This is not a description of a scene from some horror movie. This gruesome parade of corpses has been surfacing in Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province, since last July. Declan Walsh writes in “Guardian” (March 2011) , “Several human rights groups, including Amnesty International, have accounted for more than 100 bodies – lawyers, students, taxi drivers, farm workers. Most have been tortured…If you have not heard of this epic killing spree, though, don' t worry: neither have most Pakistanis. Newspaper reports from Balochistan are buried quietly on the inside pages, cloaked in euphemisms or, quite often, not published at all.” He further says, “This is Pakistan's dirty little war. While foreign attention is focused on the Taliban, a deadly secondary conflict is bubbling in Balochistan, a sprawling, mineral-rich province along the western borders with Afghanistan and Iran. On one side is a scrappy coalition of guerrillas fighting for independence from Pakistan; on the other is a powerful army that seeks to quash their insurgency with maximum prejudice. The revolt, which has been rumbling for more than six years, is spiced by foreign interests and intrigues – US spy bases, Chinese business, vast underground reserves of copper, oil and gold.” Almost six months back, in November 2010 , the president of the Balochistan National Party ( BNP), Sardar Akhtar Mengal, is reported to have called on the head of the European Union in Brussels, Belgium,and apprised him about the alleged military operation in Balochistan and also about “issues like missing persons, systematic elimination of Baloch political leaders and activists and violation of human rights at the hand of government functionaries” . According to the BNP’s information secretary, Mengal produced a memorandum which he is reported to have already sent to the Secretary-General of United Nations, Ban Ki-moon. In the letter, Mengal accused security forces and secret agencies of carrying out targeted killings of Baloch political activists. He said that corpses of executed missing persons are regularly being found, adding that the issue of missing persons is still awaiting proper attention. He told the EU chief that Baloch political opponent were being brutally tortured in illegal torture cells and later their corpses were thrown in desolate places across Balochistan. ..such incidents had become a matter of routine. Hong Kong based Asian Human Rights Commission claims it has collected details of detention and torture centers in Pakistan, where missing persons are held for long periods of time for their alleged involvement in terrorist and sabotage activities. The information about the places of illegal detention was collected from the persons who were detained in these centers for several years after arrest. Their whereabouts were never made known to their family members. Military intelligence (MI), Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), Federal Intelligence Agency (FIA), Pakistan Rangers, and the Frontier Constabulary (FC) are the main agencies who are keeping persons incommunicado and who torture them to confess their involvement in anti-state activities. In Balochistan province there are dozens of military detention centers, where people after their arrest, are detained and tortured to force confession statements about their alleged activities. AHRC statement, released in June 2008 , says, “It is interesting to note that the army officials are interrogating persons from Balochistan to force a confession admitting their involvement with the Balochistan Liberation Army ( BLA) and those arrested from Sindh about their involvement with the Sindh Liberation Army (SLA).  The military rulers are certain that both these organizations are working to disassociate themselves fro Pakistan.” Since the inception of Pakistan, the baloch people have been facing the wrath of the state of Pakistan. It is the fifth or sixth military intervention in Balochistan chasing the young and old, and women and children, into rugged mountains and deserts of the province for long periods of sufferings. After the assassination of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, particularly the Baloch youth is fighting for their rights. These are not only the tribesmen, but educated classes, teachers, students and other parts of emerging Baloch middle class are also taking part in the struggle against atrocities also, and hence being tortured and killed. The Baloch people are also the victim of violence being perpetrated by religious and sectarian militant groups. The pro- Taliban elements are active in the province whereas sectarian groups have been targeting members of the Shia community, particularly the Persian-speaking Hazaras. Such sectarian attacks are on the rise occurring mainly in the provincial capital, Quetta. The pro-Taliban Islamist groups are attacking those who act contrary to their interpretation of Islam. Teachers and students are being killed allegedly by the security agencies or by the Islamist groups or by the both. In early June this year, a complete shutter-down strike was observed in most parts of Balochistan to protest against the killing of prominent Baloch intellectual Professor Ghulam Husain Saba Dashtiari, called “Baloch Noam Chomsky” in www.thebalochhal. com editorial. The strike call was given by Baloch National Front and was observed in Khuzdar, Kech, Pasni, Gwadar, Nushki, Panjgur, Hoshab, Tump, Mand and adjoining areas, suspending all trade and business activities. All major markets, banks and even chemists in these areas remained closed for the day. The University of Balochistan was also shut to mourn the killing. Prof Ghulam Hussain, commonly known as Saba Dashtiari, was gunned down in broad daylight in Quetta. Dashtiari was known for his affinity with Baloch nationalist groups and his anti-establishment views. The Ansarul Islam, a little-known militant organization, claimed responsibility for the murder. Its spokesperson, who identified himself as Saifullah, said that the group would target anyone it deemed anti-jihad. Dashtiari became an active member of the Baloch nationalist movement in 2007 because of the dramatic increase in numbers of ‘ missing’ persons and army operation. He attended gatherings of the Baloch Republican Party, the Baloch Students Organisation and Baloch National Front. He was often a keynote speaker at demonstrations and seminars arranged by these groups. He blamed the military and the intelligence agencies for torturing and killing Baloch activists and even refused a presidential award from former president Pervez Musharraf in protest against the violation of human rights in Balochistan. Teachers, professors, and school administrators have found their lives increasingly under threat in Balochistan. Between January 2008 and October 2010 , suspected militant groups or agencies targeted and killed at least 22 teachers and other education personnel in the province. The Human Rights Watch laments that the most affected ethnic group currently is the Baloch because it is they who are losing teachers. It is their children whose education is affected, and it is their future that is at stake. The net result of the dirty wars in Balochistan is that despite being rich in gas, oil and other minerals, the province stands out with the worst social indicators. According to the World Bank, it scores lowest in 10 key indicators for education, literacy, health, water and sanitation for 2006-07. Poverty in Balochistan has risen and “become statistically indistinguishable from that in NWFP, the province with traditionally the highest measured poverty.” The very unfortunate situation in Balochistan, however, seem to have raised little concern in other parts of the country. The ethnic media appears more concerned about the ‘ghairat business’ or events occurred in Karachi or Islamabad. Ali Dayan Hasan of Human Rights Watch concludes in an interview that the Pakistani media does not report on the brutal realities of Balochistan in any meaningful manner…Its people suffer from persistent, systematic and widespread human rights abuse both by state authorities and at the hands of non-state actors.  

Why Burma Matters

While the world’s attention is focused on the ongoing tension in the South China Sea, rebels in Burma are creating problems for the western extreme of Southeast Asia.  Though never fully pacified, Burma has made modest gains in subduing -- or at least co-opting -- the various ethnic groups that challenge the central government’s rule. But the past few days have seen troubling signs that this relative tranquillity may begin to unravel with  Kachin rebels  in Burma’s northwest fighting a series of skirmishes with government forces.  Ethnic unrest in Burma isn’t new and certainly isn’t surprising. A Chinese-built dam under construction on the  Taping River  in Burma has concerned the local population since construction began. The dam, which is in the area just opposite the border with China’s Yunnan Province, is intended to send electricity to China, Burma’s biggest patron. The Chinese working on the project are said to feel threatened and many are fleeing back to China. The refugee situation is reminiscent of the Kokang clashes in 2009 , which created rare  public tension  between China and Burma’s leaders.  Further to the south, China is enlisting the help of another  ethnic opposition  group to help find four missing Chinese engineers. These engineers were also working on an unpopular hydropower project. In this case, the rebels made a demand to the Chinese that they restrain Burma’s government forces from entering the area while they search for the missing Chinese, lest they start a larger conflict These developments must be unsettling to China given its extensive interests in Burma. To begin with, as noted in a recent  Economist  article, an estimated 2 million Chinese live in Burma’s northern states. Economically, China has many resource extraction and hydropower production operations in the country.  Furthermore, Burma is a key geopolitical asset to China in that friendly relations with its government offers access to the Indian Ocean and an outpost against further Indian penetration into Southeast Asia.  China desires stability in the region as a means of protecting its interests there. As demonstrated in the Kokang clashes, China will chastise Burma if it sees the junta’s actions as inimical to Chinese interests. However, this time is different in that it’s the pursuit of Chinese interests, namely clearing the area of the hydropower project from hostile Kachin entities, that’s disturbing the peace.  Consequently, KIA spokesmen have hinted at the possibility of intentionally targeting Chinese assets. If this happens, then China can’t sit idly by. There is already speculation that the situation may necessitate some level of Chinese involvement. However, increased Chinese involvement in this area could elicit a response from Burma’ s other neighbour in this region. India values Burma just as much, and so is watching these developments closely. India’s growing economy requires the same resources from Burma currently heading north to China.  India would also like to push its influence further into Southeast Asia, and Burma is crucial to that end. In regards to security, northwest Burma is thought to be a safe haven for insurgents operating in India’s restive north- eastern states. Finally, unresolved border disputes with China and a growing paranoia within India of Chinese encirclement makes minimizing Chinese influence in Burma a key security goal for India. Distrust of Chinese motives in Burma is the motivation behind India’s warming relations with the country’s generals, despite their continued abhorrent behaviour.  Clearly, the situation must be handled delicately by all parties. The tri-border area sits ominously between a Sino-Indian rivalry that will shape the future of the region. Something must therefore be done by the Burmese government to reinstate some level of control over this region, otherwise, it could become a vacuum in which Chinese and Indian interests directly clash.  But despite the gravity of the situation, the United States has still been missing from this discussion. The problem is that US policy has removed it from relevance in Burma. Developments in Burma should be of concern, yet the United States has so far chosen to allow human rights concerns to inhibit meaningful engagement.  Selective US policies in the ‘Arab Spring’ demonstrated that US diplomacy can be pragmatic when necessary.  With this in mind, US policymakers should re-evaluate relations with Burma. Without improved US-Burma ties, the country could evolve into an unstable,  WMD-proliferating  client state of China, serving as a buffer to India while also giving China valuable access to the Indian Ocean. This outcome conjures images of a tropical North Korea. But contrary to appearances, there’ s no deep affinity between Burma and China; it’s purely a relationship of necessity for Burma. Conversely, improving ties with it and possibly dislodging it from Beijing’s orbit could benefit the United States by aiding a budding ally in India while removing a source of tension within ASEAN.