The almost decade- long  American war in Afghanistan  has  now reached the beginning of  the  end. All hopes of anything like   "victory" have long since  vanished,  but so have most fears  that falling  short of victory will  jeopardize  American national  security. The  essential remaining  questions,  then, are what they  once were in  Vietnam: How fast  do we leave?  And what do we  leave behind? My  impression,  after a short trip to  Afghanistan,  is that the United  States should  leave faster than  President  Barack Obama appears  to want  to, but slowly enough to  give the  Afghans at least a chance  to  stave off total collapse. You can  certainly meet officials  here who  believe, as Simon Gass,  NATO's  new senior civilian  representative,  does, that "we can  leave behind  a stable platform" by  the current  2014  target date for  withdrawal.  But a U.S. official with   considerable experience in   Afghanistan offered a much more   tentative metaphor: "Can we   thread the needle here by 2014 ?"   he asked. "Yes, but it will take   some luck." Pakistan would have  to apply pressure to the  sanctuaries  where insurgents now  shelter, the  Afghan army would  have to make  major strides in  professionalism,  and "we're going  to need more  political will  expressed by  President [Hamid]  Karzai." "Any sign of that?" I asked.  "No," he said, citing the Afghan   president's continuing protection  of highly placed criminals and   warlords and unwillingness to   permit independent political   institutions, including the   parliament, to flourish. So why  bother at all? Why not crate  everything up and leave as fast as   possible? There are several   answers to this question, some   quite persuasive. A Taliban   conquest of large parts of the   country would be a terrible  enough fate for the Afghan  people, but  worse yet would be a  collapse into  a 1990 s-style civil  war, an  apocalyptic fear that is  widely  shared by Afghans as well  as  internationals. Left on its own,  the  army is likely to fragment  along  ethnic lines, thanks in part  to  Karzai himself, who has  permitted  the warlords around  him to parcel  out the most senior  military posts  to their own  loyalists. The  Somalization of  Afghanistan would  be even more  dreadful than a  Talibanization,  and certainly yet  more inviting to  al Qaeda. A more optimistic  account holds  that something  better is in the  offing on the other  side of the  planned national  election in 2014.  A new  Afghanistan is struggling to  be  born, one often hears, an   Afghanistan of institutions rather   than one of tribal and ethnic   loyalties. A vibrant private sector  is emerging; an unfettered media,  in  league with civil society  groups, is  exposing the corruption  and  cynicism of the old order; a  new  generation has been weaned  on  Western ideals and  technology.  Mahmoud Saikal, a  former deputy  foreign minister  and now a  political opponent of  Karzai's, says  that he and allies  are forming a " national coalition"  of such forces  well in advance of  2014  to  demonstrate that an  alternative  exists. Saikal, like  other Afghans I  spoke with, is  worried about " America's short- term vision," by  which he means  American  impatience with the  Afghan  adventure. That new  Afghanistan is no mirage, but  even by 2014  it will probably  not  be able to contend with the old  one captained by Karzai. Even if   Karzai, who is widely said to be   exhausted and played out,  chooses not to run once again,  the power  brokers in the palace  will use all  the means at their  disposal to keep their grip on  power. Karzai himself  has already  tried to preserve his  freedom of  maneuver by writing to U.N.  Secretary-General Ban Ki- moon,  asking the organization to   abandon its current role   overseeing national elections. So  the bridge to the future is   extremely rickety, and perhaps   also booby-trapped. But the U.S.   official I spoke to said that he   would advocate a deliberate   drawdown of forces even if he   thought the probability of a good   outcome in 2014  was low. Hasn't   the West created a "moral hazard"   for itself, he asks, by making  such  elaborate unfulfilled  promises to  the Afghan people  over the years?  Quite apart from  any calculus of  national interest,  isn't it morally  unacceptable to  leave the Afghans  to fend for  themselves?
 

